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HE case selection for this recent case update is very arbitrary. If a
case is not mentioned, it is completely the author's fault. This Ar-
ticle covers cases through this year's advance sheet number 41.1 It
also includes Texas Supreme Court cases through 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
number 3 and a selection of cases from the federal courts.
I. MORTGAGES AND FORECLOSURES
Cadle Company v. Butler2 involved a situation in which a vendor
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. See In re L.A.M. & Assoc., 975 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998).
2. 951 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
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brought a declatory judgment action to determine that his deed of trust
lien was superior to a judgment lien. Alternatively, he sought a declara-
tion that the judgment creditor was not a bona fide purchaser of the real
property affected by the lien. In November 1987, the Weaklys signed a
note in favor of Butler secured by a deed of trust. The note matured in
November 1988, but, contrary to the common practice in Texas, the ma-
turity date of the note was not shown in the deed of trust. There were a
number of oral extensions of the maturity date, but no written extension
signed by both parties was entered into until October 1993.
Cadle obtained a judgment against the Weaklys in March 1993 and ab-
stracted it in May of that year. In the "battle of the liens" that ensued,
Cadle argued that limitations on the Butler lien had expired before the
Cadle judgment lien had attached and that subsequent attempts to extend
it were ineffective. Butler argued that, since the deed of trust contained
no maturity date, limitations on the deed of trust were determined only
by the underlying note, whose maturity was extended by oral agreements.
The court held that the note and deed of trust were to be construed as
one agreement. 3 Sections 16.036 and 16.037 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code require extensions of lien debts to be signed by both
parties to the transaction and recorded in order to suspend the running of
limitations. 4 If a bona fide purchaser (BFP) acquires an interest in the
property when no renewal or extension agreements are recorded and
when the lien debt appears to be four years past due, the lien debt is void
as to the BFP.5 Where there is no recorded, properly executed extension
agreement, the maturity date stated in the original instrument is conclu-
sive evidence of the maturity date of the debt.6
Butler argued that Cadle could have acquired notice of the oral exten-
sions of the debt and lien. In essence, if Cadle had inquired about the
maturity set out in the original note, he would have learned about the
extensions of that maturity. Basically, Butler's argument was that the
ability to discover the existence of an oral extension is sufficient to satisfy
the notice requirements of section 16.036 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.7
The court, in a lengthy analysis, disagreed. 8 The purpose of the statute
of limitations would be totally defeated if lienholders could assert an out-
standing interest in real property against all third parties by refusing to
record extension or renewal agreements and then claiming parol exten-
sion agreements had been made.9 The purpose of requiring recording of
renewals and extensions is to protect BFPs against the evils of secret liens
3. See id. at 909.
4. See id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.036, 16.037 (Vernon
Supp. 1999)).
5. See id. at 909.
6. See id. at 909.
7. See id. at 910.




and the subsequent frauds. 10
In Swedlund v. Banner," John and Maureen Swedlund borrowed
$30,000 from a bank, secured by a deed of trust on their residence. They
were unable to pay at maturity, so the bank extended the note for two
years, at which time they were again unable to pay. To prevent foreclo-
sure, Banner purchased the note and liens from the bank. On the same
day the liens were transferred to Banner, John and Maureen signed a
second note for around $26,000, payable in 48 monthly installments. This
second note did not refer to the liens at all, although it was clear that this
note was a renewal of the bank's original note. John and Maureen de-
faulted on this note as well. Banner then presented John and Maureen
with two additional notes, one for the balance of the second note and
another for some other funds advanced to John and Maureen. John
signed them; Maureen did not.
Ultimately Banner sued John and Maureen, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that established the balance due on the note and the existence of
the lien securing the note. Maureen counterclaimed, asking the court to
declare that no lien existed and contending that, in the absence of a writ-
ten agreement extending the lien, Banner's claims were barred by limita-
tions. Banner filed a response and a motion for summary judgment,
claiming that the documents which were executed in connection with
Banner's acquisition of the bank's note and lien evidenced the parties'
intent that the security interest held by the bank be transferred to Banner
to secure payment of the second note. In addition, Banner claimed that
limitations did not bar recovery because, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice
& Remedies Code section 16.035(e), limitations on an installment note
do not commence until the date of the last installment. The trial court
granted Banner's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment
against John and Maureen. 12
The deed of trust assigned to Banner provided that it was security for
the first note. The deed of trust also contained a provision stating that:
All or any of the notes or other indebtedness hereby secured may be
from time to time renewed or extended by the holder or holders
thereof, and in any such case all the provisions of this deed of trust
and the lien hereof, shall remain in full force and with the same ef-
fect as if said note or notes or other indebtedness had originally been
made to mature at such extended time or times.13
Maureen contended that even though the second note was in the entire
amount due on the first note, the parties did not agree to extend the first
note. The court held that even though her contention was disputed by
the affidavit of Banner, the deed of trust covenant regarding extensions
was sufficient to extend the lien.t4 The court further held that limitations
10. See id.
11. 970 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
12. See id. at 109.
13. Id. at 110-11.
14. See id. at 111.
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did not run until four years after the date of the last installment on the
second note.15
The court did not discuss the application of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code to its two holdings. Perhaps it should have. Section
16.035 says that foreclosure of a lien must occur not later than four years
after the day the cause of action accrues. 16 For the first note, the date
was March 26, 1983. Banner didn't file suit until October 23, 1990. Sec-
tion 16.036 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code seems to re-
quire compliance with it in order to extend limitations to cover the
second note. 17 Section 16.036 states that the parties liable on a lien debt
can suspend the running of the statute of limitations only by a written
extension agreement as provided in that section.' 8 The second note does
not appear to have qualified as such an extension agreement; in my opin-
ion, limitations had long since expired by the time this lawsuit was
brought.
In Walton v. First National Bank of Trenton,' 9 the bank had a note
secured by a vendor's lien and deed of trust. The maker of the note died,
and the bank proceeded to make the claim on its note through the pro-
bate court. After first seeking the district court's confirmation of the pro-
bate claim, which was opposed by the administrator of the estate, the
bank filed a trespass to try title action based on the vendor's lien and
superior title.
Superior title is held by the vendor where an express vendor's lien is
retained to secure unpaid purchase money, and the purchaser has only an
equitable right to acquire title by carrying out the agreement. 20 An ex-
press vendor's lien is different from a regular mortgage. 21 For one thing,
a claim based on a mortgage is subordinate to the administration of an
estate, but a claim based on a vendor's lien is not because the vendor
retains superior title to the property and the purchaser's death cannot
transform his title into something different from what he had before.22
The vendor has a choice of remedies on the purchaser's default.23 He
may sue for his money; he may rescind the contract and take possession;
or he may sue to recover title and possession.2 4 The remedy of rescission
is independent of the remedies to enforce payment.2 5 Thus, the bank
could sue for the land rather than the money and could bring that suit in
district court rather than in the probate court.2 6
15. See id.
16. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
17. See id. § 16.036.
18. See id.
19. 956 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
20. See id. at 651.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 652.
24. See Walton, 956 S.W.2d at 652.
25. See id. at 652.
26. See id. at 652.
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In Dayton Reavis Corporation v. Rampart Capital Corporation,27 Ram-
part owned a note signed by Cameron Henderson Oil Company
(CHOC). It believed it held deeds of trust to secure the note covering
land owned by Dayton Reavis Corporation (Dayton). Rampart posted
the property for foreclosure, at which time CHOC and Dayton obtained
an injunction stopping the foreclosure. Rampart then sought and was
granted the appointment of a receiver by the trial court.
Dayton claimed on appeal that the receivership order should not have
been entered. Dayton claimed the receivership and the injunction against
foreclosure were mutually exclusive remedies. It relied on Jackson v. The
Praetorians,28 which held that an injunction which prevented the sale of
the real estate protected the owner's undisturbed possession of the prop-
erty.29 The court distinguished the injunction in this case. Here, the only
thing enjoined by the court was the foreclosure sale, and that was for the
purpose of resolving certain issues before the sale.30 There was nothing
exclusive about these two remedies. 31 Each remedy recognized the exist-
ence of the dispute, and each was designed to preserve the status quo
pending a trial.32
In Katy Personal Storage, Inc. v. First State Bank,33 the bank's foreclo-
sure and recording of its trustee's deed immediately after the trial court's
denial of an injunction to stop the foreclosure made the appeal of that
denial moot.34
In Blount v. Dutton,35 the Duttons owned a tract of land, and Colson, a
constable conducting a constable's sale of the property, "struck it off" to
Blount. Blount, in fact, was a deputy constable, although he was not han-
dling the sale of the property.
The Duttons argued that prior statutes and case law prohibit an officer
or deputy involved with the sale from purchasing the property. Blount,
on the other hand, argued that a literal reading of the statute only prohib-
its the officer or deputy who is actually conducting the sale from purchas-
ing the property. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 34.048
states: "If an officer or his deputy conducting an execution sale directly or
indirectly purchases the property, the sale is void."'36 The statutes in ef-
fect before section 34.04837 had been construed by the Texas Supreme
Court to prohibit the purchase of property at an execution sale by any
deputy of the officer conducting the sale.38
27. 968 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
28. 80 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, no writ).
29. See Dayton Reavis, 968 S.W.2d at 531.
30. See id. at 532.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. 968 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
34. See id. at 581.
35. 967 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
36. TEX. Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.048 (Vernon 1997).
37. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Art. 3770 (1925).
38. See Blount, 967 S.W.2d at 957 (citing Davis v. Howe, 213 S.W. 609 (Tex. 1919)).
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The court held that the codification of the prohibition into the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code should not change the substance of the prior
law.39 A mere change in phraseology in the revision of a statute should
not work a change in the law previously declared unless it indisputably
appears that such was the intent of the legislature. 40 That appearance did
not exist here, so the court held that the statute intended to void any sales
where the property was purchased by any deputy of the constable.4'
In Vogel v. The Travelers Indemnity Company,42 when a proposed re-
newal of a loan fell through (mainly because the Vogels couldn't satisfy a
number of conditions to closing), Travelers began foreclosure proceed-
ings. These were temporarily derailed by a TRO granted by the state trial
court. Travelers had the matter removed to the Federal courts, where the
Vogels were unable to obtain an injunction to prevent the foreclosure.
The foreclosure proceeded. The Federal court then dismissed the injunc-
tion proceedings as moot.
The Vogels tried to negotiate a repurchase of the property but were
also unable to complete that transaction. Eventually, they sued Travelers
for wrongful foreclosure. Summary judgment was granted to Travelers,
although the grounds for summary judgment were not clearly set out.43
Among the other points of error raised on appeal, the Vogels con-
tended that summary judgment on Travelers' affirmative defense of res
judicata was improper. Res judicata is applicable only where there is a
prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction,
identification of parties or those in privity with them, and a second action
based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the
first action.44 Determining what constitutes the subject matter of a suit
requires an examination of the factual background of the claim in the
prior litigation.4 5 The court noted that
Texas has adopted the "transactional" approach to res judicata. In
determining whether claims arise out of the same subject matter and
thereby constitute a single "transaction," the court considers: (1)
their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation; (2) whether
the claims form a convenient trial unity; and (3) whether their treat-
ment as a trial unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage. 46
Here, the court found that the Vogels' claims in this lawsuit were not
previously litigated in the injunction action, and thus there was no final
judgment on the merits in that case.47 In addition, the claim asserted that




42. 966 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.).
43. See id. at 751.






gin or motivation. Seeking an injunction before foreclosure and seeking
recovery based on wrongful foreclosure are two different things, sought at
two distinct periods of time in relation to the foreclosure. 48 Furthermore,
treating the claims as a trial unit would not conform to the Vogels' expec-
tations.49 Res judicata did not apply, and summary judgment based on
res judicata was improper, and other grounds for the summary judgment
would have to be found.50
The Vogels also argued that Travelers had breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing owed to them under the Note. The Vogels con-
tended that the deed of trust expressly established a duty of good faith
and fair dealing by providing that it was to be construed as a security
agreement under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
The court held that because the deed of trust is a mortgage, it is not
subject to interpretation under the UCC.51 The deed of trust merely re-
cited that it was to be construed as a security agreement under the UCC
only with respect to goods that are fixtures. Travelers did not owe a stat-
utory duty of good faith with respect to a real property foreclosure. 52
Furthermore, there is no common law duty of good faith and fair dealing
that ordinarily exists between mortgagor and mortgagee. 53 That duty ex-
ists only where there is a "special relationship" between the parties
marked by a shared trust or an imbalance in bargaining power.54 Travel-
ers was therefore entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 55
The Vogels final argument was that the foreclosure was wrongful be-
cause Travelers failed to comply with the terms of the note and deed of
trust and because of Travelers' breach of the duty of good faith. Since
Travelers owed the Vogels no duty of good faith and fair dealing, how-
ever, there could not have been a breach of this duty. The Vogels admit-
ted that the foreclosure complied with the statutory foreclosure
requirements, and without an additional duty there was no wrongful
foreclosure. 56
In the case of Sanders v. Shelton,57 Donald Shelton exercised a deed of
trust to secure his $9,000 debt to his former wife, Zellena. The deed de-
scribes certain real property belinging to Shelton. When he defaulted the
substitute trustee gave notice that he would conduct a foreclosure sale
between the hours of ten o'clock and four o'clock (but didn't specify the
exact hour). Just before ten o'clock a.m. on the day of the sale, the
debtor sold the property to Sanders and Fisher, purportedly free of liens.
Sanders and Fisher then hung around the courthouse until four o'clock,
48. See Vogel, 966 S.W.2d at 752.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 753.





57. 970 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
1999] 1399
SMU LAW REVIEW
but never located the foreclosure sale. The trustee then sold the property
at about eleven o'clock to Zellena Shelton. Sanders and Fisher sued to
set aside the sale, alleging it was void for a number of reasons, including
that the notice of sale failed to state exactly when the sale was going to
begin.
Texas Property Code section 51.002 provides that the foreclosure no-
tice must state the earliest time at which the sale will occur and that the
sale must be held within three hours of that time.58 The court held that
this notice complied with the statute. 59 The notice makes it perfectly
clear that the sale would begin no earlier than ten o'clock a.m. 60 No
more is required. The statute does not require the notice to state that the
sale will conclude within three hours of the earliest stated time; it just
requires that the sale actually be completed by then.
In Milliorn v. Finance Plus, Inc.,61 Milliorn executed a series of notes to
the bank, including a $38,000 note and a $320,000 note. The $320,000
note was secured by an assignment of another note and the liens securing
it. The notes were cross-collateralized. The bank ultimately failed and
the notes were sold to Finance Plus. Finance Plus foreclosed on the col-
lateral specifically securing the $320,000 note. Its notice of foreclosure
referred to the $320,000 note and the collateral securing it. However, it
appears that the notice of foreclosure was not posted at the courthouse
door. The trial court held that this failure to post the notice was sufficient
evidence that the foreclosure was not conducted in a commercially rea-
sonable manner.62 It barred recovery on the $320,000 note, but entered
judgment in favor of Finance Plus on the $38,000 note.63
Milliorn claimed the unreasonable foreclosure should bar recovery on
both notes because they were cross-collateralized. The court of appeals
held that cross-collateralization did not magically transform the two notes
into one and upheld the trial court's judgment on the $38,000 note.64
Advantage Group Investment, Inc. v. Pacific Southwest Bank, F.S.B.65
deals with notice issues arising from an interim agreement. In the mid-
eighties, AGI borrowed $1,600,000 from Charter Savings pursuant to a
promissory note. After defaulting on the notes, AGI was sued by Char-
ter. After the lawsuit began, AGI and Charter entered into an Interim
Agreement, pursuant to which AGI agreed not to seek a temporary re-
straining order to stop a foreclosure, and Charter agreed not to foreclose
without giving thirty days notice.
Later that same year Charter was declared insolvent, and FSLIC sold
Charter's assets to Pacific Southwest Bank (PSB). Pacific foreclosed on
58. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1995).
59. See Sanders, 970 S.W.2d at 725.
60. See id. at 725.
61. 973 S.W.2d 690 (Tex .App.-Eastland 1998, pet. denied).
62. See id. at 693.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. 972 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
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the real property securing the loans but gave only the statutory twenty-
one-day notice, rather than the thirty days required by the Interim
Agreement.
PSB was not a party to the Interim Agreement. Furthermore, when it
took over the assets of Charter, PSB specifically disclaimed the assump-
tion of any of Charter's liabilities or obligations. The court held that PSB
had not "stepped into the shoes" of Charter with respect to the Interim
Agreement. 66
The D'Oench, Duhme67 doctrine and 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e) also
exempt Pacific from the notice obligation under the Interim Agree-
ment.68 D'Oench, Duhme protects FSLIC from secret agreements not
reflected in the documents of a failed bank.69 As codified, the agree-
ments need not even be secret. 70 The court held that the Interim Agree-
ment was covered by the doctrine; the Interim Agreement did "defeat or
diminish" an interest in the assets in question.71 Also, the court held that
the Interim Agreement was not, as argued by AGI, a part of the loan
documents, but rather was a collateral and separate agreement, executed
at a different time and as a compromise between Charter and AGI.72
II. PROMISSORY NOTES, LOAN COMMITMENTS AND
LOAN AGREEMENTS
In the case of Cox v. Lehrman,73 Cox was a divorce lawyer who en-
gaged Lehrman, a psychologist, to testify on his client's behalf. After the
client signed a promissory note to pay for Lehrman's services, Cox sent a
letter which said, "[i]f after reasonable attempts Mrs. Egan is unable or
refuses, I will pay your bills for court appearances. '74 The client failed to
pay, so Lehrman sought payment from Cox based upon the guaranty
letter.
The law recognizes two distinct types of guaranty: guaranty of payment
and guaranty of collection. 75 "A guaranty of collection is an undertaking
of the guarantor to pay if the debt cannot be collected from the primary
obligor by the use of reasonable diligence. ' 76 With such a guaranty, the
principal debtor must be joined in the suit unless excused pursuant to the
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. 77 A guaranty of payment is an
66. See id. at 870.
67. 315 8 U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 957 (1942) (now codified as 12 USC
§ 1823(e) (1989), as amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-




71. See Advantage Group, Inc., at 870.
72. See id.
73. 949 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
74. Id. at 529.





obligation to pay the debt when due if the debtor does not.78 There is no
condition precedent to enforcing a guaranty of payment other than a de-
fault by the principal obligor.79 A guarantor of payment is primarily lia-
ble and waives any requirement that the holder of the note take action
against the maker;80 thus he is akin to a co-maker of the note.81 A lender
may bring an action against a payment guarantor without joining the
principal obligor.82
Cox argued that Lehrman failed to fulfill the "reasonable attempts"
condition precedent by failing to sue the principal obligor.83 The court
found no cases establishing the definition of "reasonable attempts" at
debt collection. 84 However, relying on Rule 31 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, 85 and section 17.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code,86 the court found that it was necessary in the case of a
collection guaranty to join the principal obligor as a condition precedent
to the action against the guarantor.87 Thus, the court construed Rule 31
and section 17.001 to establish the "reasonable attempts" requirements,
which Lehrman had failed to satisfy.88
In Star Food Processing, Inc. v. Killian,89 Star signed a note to Killian
which contained a waiver of all "notices, demands for payment, presenta-
tions for payment, notices of intention to accelerate the maturity, protest
and notice of protest." 90 After a default, Killian spoke to her attorney
about accelerating the debt. The attorney faxed a notice of acceleration
and demanded payment in full. In fact, two hours before the fax notice of
acceleration, Star had placed the late payment in the mail. Star kept
sending regular payments, but each one was returned because the pay-
ments were not made in full.
Based upon Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp.,91 which requires ex-
press waivers of notices of intention to accelerate and notice of accelera-
tion, the court held that Star had not waived notice of acceleration. 92 The
jury in the trial court had found that payment was made before notice of
acceleration.93 The trial court disregarded the jury's finding and entered
78. See id.




83. See id. at 530.
84. Id. at 531.
85. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 31 (The statute states in pertinent part: "no surety shall be sued
unless this principal is joined with him").
86. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.001 (Vernon 1997) (The statute
states in pertinent part: "the acceptor of a bill or exchange or a principal obligor in a
contract may be sued alone or jointly with another liable party.").
87. See Cox, 949 S.W.2d at 531.
88. See id.
89. 954 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
90. Id. at 125.
91. 801 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1991).
92. See Star Food Processing, 954 S.W.2d at 126.
93. See id. at 127.
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judgment in favor of Killian that the note was properly accelerated. 94
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the
note had not been properly accelerated because payment had been made
before acceleration. 95
Killian then argued that Star had failed to plead and prove payment as
an affirmative defense. The court said that the affirmative defense of
payment was inapplicable.96 This case involved the question of whether
the note was properly accelerated, and did not involve questions about
the amount of the debt.
In C&A Investments, Inc. v. Bonnet Resources Corp.,97 C&A con-
tracted to purchase loans from Bank One. Bonnet was Bank One's
agent. The bid documents contained extensive disclaimers about the
quality of the loans specifically stating that statements in the schedule of
loans about whether the loan in question was current were not reliable.
Other documents also contained disclaimers about the quality of the
loans and statements to the effect that C&A would rely on its own
investigations.
The loan that became troublesome was identified as "Loan E." Several
times before the scheduled closing date for Loan E, statements were
made by a Bonnet officer made the statement that the loan actually was
current. The officer's statement was false, however, and the fact that it
was not current was subsequently made known to C&A before the clos-
ing. C&A then told Bonnet it would not purchase Loan E, and de-
manded the return of its earnest money. Bonnet refused, and C&A
responded by suing Bonnet for breach of contract and fraud.
As to the breach of contract claim, Bonnet argued that the disclaimers
in the bid documents and the other documents precluded any statements
about the loan in the bid documents themselves from becoming a term of
the parties' bargain or enforceable representations. The court agreed.98
From the documents, the court concluded that the statements about the
loan made in the bid documents and other documents between the par-
ties were not a part of the contract and could not be relied upon.99
C&A claimed that it relied upon the repeated assertions by the Bonnet
officer that Loan E was performing when it entered into the agreement to
buy the loan. Absent these representations, C&A would not have en-
tered into the contract to buy Loan E. Bonnet contended that C&A, in
its purchase agreement, agreed to buy the loans "as is" and "with all
faults," and that C&A had been warned that the information about the
loan was faulty and could not be relied upon. The court agreed with Bon-




97. 959 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied).
98. See id. at 261.




regarding disclaimers and concluded that C&A could not have justifiably
relied upon any statements about the quality of Loan E.101
In Geary v. Texas Commerce Bank, National Association,0 2 Steven Co-
rey and Incorsel (a corporation wholly owned by Corey) co-signed a
promissory note to TCB. When Corey died Geary became the independ-
ent executor of his estate. Geary placed Incorsel into a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy; Incorsel emerged a year later under a confirmed plan. As part of
the reorganization, TCB received a partial payment on the note and
promised to assert no future claims against Incorsel. In addition, the plan
settled any obligation of Incorsel alone and any obligation of Incorsel
"and any other person" to any entity. TCB did not object to or appeal
from the entry of the plan.
TCB sued Geary, as executor for Corey's estate, for the balance of the
note. Geary moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the bank-
ruptcy plan ended Corey's obligations on the note and was res judicata on
TCB's claim.
In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court agreed and held that
the bankruptcy plan was res judicata. 10 3 As executor of the co-obligor's
estate, Geary represented the estate's interest in bankruptcy. The bank-
ruptcy reorganization plan addressed those interests by purporting to re-
lease the estate's shared debt with Incorsel. Geary was therefore a party
to the bankruptcy and could assert res judicata because the bankruptcy
proceeding affecting his liabilities as executor. 104 Geary was entitled to
rely on the bankruptcy order releasing the estate's shared debt. 0 5
In Commercial Services of Perry, Inc. v. Woolridge,106 Commercial
Services bought a note Woolridge had given to Fort Worth State Bank
(FWST). The note was to bear interest at 13.25 percent per annum ini-
tially, and then fluctuate based on FWST's prime rate. FWST was later
closed and taken over by the FDIC. Commercial Services sued Wool-
ridge to collect on the note. It appeared that Commercial Services
charged Woolridge interest at the 13.25% rate throughout the term of its
ownership of the note.
In order "[t]o collect on a promissory note, the holder or payee must
establish that: (1) there is a note; (2) it is the legal owner and holder of
the note; (3) the defendant is the maker of the note; and (4) a certain
balance is due and owing on the note.' 0 7
Where a note provides for a variable rate tied to a no-longer published
prime rate of a defunct institution, the trier of fact should apply a reason-
able rate of interest if evidence of a reasonable rate of interest is shown in
101. See id.
102. 967 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1998).
103. See id. at 837.
104. See Geary, 967 S.W.2d at 827.
105. See id.
106. 968 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
107. Id. at 564.
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the record.108 Here, the court held that there was no evidence of a rea-
sonable rate.10 9 Commercial Services attempted to get Woolridge's ex-
pert to testify that charging 13.25% was reasonable. Commercial Services
failed to meet this requirement because the expert testified that the in-
terest rate being charged was two and a half times the lowest rate he
remembered. 110
Commercial Services then tried to argue that Texas Business and Com-
merce Code section 3.112(b) allowed it to apply the judgment rate of in-
terest to the note. Section 3.112(b) states: "If an instrument provides for
interest, but the amount of interest payable cannot be ascertained from
the description, interest is payable at the judgment rate."11' The court
held this was inapplicable to the case at hand.1'2 It applies where the
note is silent as to how to calculate interest, not where there is a failure to
prove a reasonable substitute rate.113 To hold otherwise, the court said,
would be to reward Commercial Services for failing to prove its case. 114
In Boland v. Mundaca Investment Corp.,115 the Bolands executed a
promissory note in the amount of $100,000 to buy thirty-five acres in Co-
mal County. The property was collateral for the loan. Mundaca acquired
the note, and, after several defaults by the Bolands, foreclosed on the
land, selling it at foreclosure for $44,000. About eight months later,
Mundaca's lawyer sent a letter to the Bolands demanding payment of a
deficiency in the amount of $13,000. In fact, that number was a mistake,
the actual deficiency amount being well over $40,000. The Bolands took
advantage of the mistake, sending in the $13,000 with all sorts of nota-
tions about being in "full settlement" of claims, etc. The check was en-
dorsed and cashed. Then Mundaca discovered its mistake and sought to
collect the remaining balance of the deficiency. In the lawsuit, the Bo-
lands argued accord and satisfaction.
To prevail on the defense of accord and satisfaction, a party must prove
the existence of a new contract, express or implied, whereby the parties
agree to discharge the existing obligation by payment of a lesser amount.
The court held that the language on the check, with its clear and unequiv-
ocal offer of an accord, and the subsequent cashing of the check constitut-
ing acceptance of the accord, was sufficient.
Mundaca's only defense to accord and satisfaction was in its unilateral
mistake. To succeed on that theory, Mundaca needed to show that the
mistake was of so great a consequence that enforcement would be uncon-
scionable, that the mistake related to a material aspect of the contract,
that it was made despite the exercise of ordinary care, and that the parties
108. See id. at 565.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.112(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
112. See Woolridge, 968 S.W.2d at 565.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. 978 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, n.w.h.).
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can be placed in status quo in a equity sense. Here, Mundaca provided
no evidence of ordinary care in coming up with the number given to the
Bolands, so its defense failed.
What the court does not discuss, and what, to my mind makes this case
wrong, is the issue of consideration. In order for accord and satisfaction
to exist, there must be consideration, just like any other contract. It has
long been held that payment of less than the full amount of an undisputed
debt cannot be consideration for accord and satisfaction. The court did
not cite, and apparently did not look at American National Insurance Co.
v. Gifford-Hill & Co.,1 1 6 where the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that
"when the true amount of the debt is not in dispute, relief may be granted
for a unilateral mistake of the creditor in accepting an underpayment or
of the debtor in making overpayment." 17 In addition, the court recog-
nized that knowledge by one party that the other is acting under a mis-
take of fact is equivalent to a mutual mistake.
III. GUARANTIES
Flo Trend Systems, Inc. v. Allwaste, Inc.118 stands for the proposition
that negligent misrepresentation claims are barred as a matter of law
when the claim relies on proof of an alleged oral agreement to answer the
debt of another, which is barred by the Statute of Frauds.119 Flo Trend
contracted with Soil and Tank Remediation Services, Inc. (STRS) for Flo
Trend to perform environmental remediation services. Allwaste had an
agreement with STRS for financing this particular job. By the time STRS
finished the job, it had lost money. Allwaste sued STRS on some notes it
held for the financing of the job. It also sued Flo Trend, seeking a declar-
atory judgment that Flo Trend was not a third party beneficiary of the
financing agreements. Flo Trend counterclaimed, alleging, among other
things, that Allwaste had negligently misrepresented that payments for
Flo Trend's work would be paid by Allwaste. Allwaste moved for a di-
rected verdict as to the negligent misrepresentation claim on the grounds
that Flo Trend was merely trying to enforce an otherwise unenforceable
oral guaranty by couching the claim as a tort rather than a suit on the
contract.
Section 26.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code requires a
promise by one person to discharge the debts of another to be in writ-
ing.120 There are exceptions to this statute of frauds, but none were avail-
able in this case. Thus, section 26.01 applied in Flo Trend to bar
enforcement of the guaranty.121 The court noted that in Weakly v. East122
a similar attempt to avoid the Statute of Frauds in conveyance transac-
116. 673 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. 673 S.W.2d at 922.
118. 948 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
119. See id. at 10.
120. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
121. See Flo Trend, 948 S.W.2d at 9.
122. 900 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
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tions did not succeed. The court in Weakly held that the claim for negli-
gent misrepresentation had an unenforceable promise to buy real
property as its nucleus. 123 The court further held that all of the claims of
negligent misrepresentation were barred because they required proof of
an alleged oral agreement that was barred by the Statute of Frauds. 124
The same rule applies to guaranties.
Ashcraft v. Lookadoo.125 was a case of first impression and presented
the issue of whether, when one party purchased a note deficiency, that
party also acquired the guaranty that secured the original note, becoming
the guaranty owner. Ashcraft purchased a note deficiency from the Res-
olution Trust Corporation (RTC). The documentation of the assignment
stated that the note deficiency and any supporting documents were lo-
cated in the asset file that was being assigned. The loan in question was
guarantied by Lookadoo, but the guaranty was neither in the asset file
nor expressly assigned to Ashcraft.
According to Ashcraft, the assignment of the note itself automatically
operated as an assignment of any separate guaranties that secure the
note, regardless of whether the parties knew about the guaranties at the
time of the assignment. The court found no evidence that Ashcraft
proved that RTC was the owner of the guaranty at the time of assignment
to Ashcraft. Thus, RTC did not have the right to assign the guaranty,
either expressly or impliedly. The court interpreted the contract to assign
only the items directly expressed: the note deficiency, and the file
contents.126
IV. USURY
Coastal Cement Sand Inc. v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc.127 dealt
with a contract for usurious interest. For several years, Coastal borrowed
from Orix, executing fifteen promissory notes. Each of the notes was a
preprinted form with certain empty blanks. For each of the notes, the
total sum was broken down into fixed, equal principal installments and
one balloon payment. The stated face amount of each note included the
pre-computed interest so that an equal monthly payment schedule could
be prepared. Each note contained the following provision:
[W]ith interest from the date hereof payable on the unpaid amount
at the maturity of each installment, until maturity at the rate of -0-%
per annum and after maturity at the highest legal contract rate, and if
placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, a reasonable sum as
attorneys' fees. Upon non-payment of any installment or interest
when due, all remaining installments shall, at the option of the
holder and without notice or demand, become immediately due and
123. See id. at 759.
124. See id.
125. 952 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997), writ denied per curiam, 977 S.W.2d 562
(Tex. 1998).
126. See id. at 913-14.
127. 956 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
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payable together with interest, collection charges and attorneys'
fees.128
One of the loans was repaid, and the others were renewed and ex-
tended more than once. Despite the presence of the acceleration clause,
Orix never accelerated the notes or collected usurious interest. Nonethe-
less, Coastal sued Orix, alleging that Orix had contracted for usurious
interest. The basis of the "contracting for" claim was that the contin-
gency of acceleration might allow Orix to collect usurious interest if the
notes were accelerated.
Orix argued that the notes did not expressly allow any contingency for
collecting usurious interest. The contract required the borrower to repay
the loan at zero percent interest and, after maturity, at the highest lawful
rate. That is, if the loans were matured, they could never bear interest at
higher than the lawful rate. According to Orix, this meant that excess
pre-computed interest was simply to be rebated.
The court was not persuaded by that argument, finding the wording of
the phrase to be unclear.'2 9 The phrase could be interpreted to mean that
the installment amounts plus zero percent interest would be due, which
would result in usury, or that the installment amounts plus the highest
lawful rate would be due, which would result in even more usury since
the installments already included interest. The court also noted that the
wording did not indicate that excess interest would be rebated. 130
When the term "installment" refers to a total that includes principal
and unearned interest, an acceleration of all installments raises the possi-
bility the note is usurious on its face. 131 Orix tried to argue that the term
referred only to the principal portion of the installments, but had no au-
thority or decent argument to support that position.
Finally, Orix attempted to have the court construe the savings clauses
in ancillary documents as preventing usury in this case, but the court re-
fused to allow acceleration clauses in other documents to determine the
terms of the acceleration clauses in the notes. Courts should be reluctant
to hold that acceleration of maturity provisions that clearly call for the
collection of unearned interest are vitiated by mere intimations of con-
trary intent found elsewhere in the contract. 32
In reaching its holding that Orix had contracted for usurious interest,
the court cited an old admonition to draftsmen:
In literally scores of cases, the courts of this state have been called
upon to decide whether a contract is usurious because it contains an
acceleration provision which allows the collection of unearned inter-
est or finance charges. In view of this, we fail to understand why
acceleration clauses are drafted which do not include a sentence ex-
pressly disavowing any intention to collect excessive unearned inter-
128. Id. at 568.
129. See id. at 570.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 571.
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est or finance charges in the event the obligation is accelerated. To
leave the matter open to doubt is to invite litigation and risk the
harsh penalties of article 5069. To settle the matter clearly in the
contract between the parties is a service to the creditor, the debtor,
and the taxpayers of this state. 33
In Pentico v. Mad-Wyler, Inc.,134 Mad-Wyler borrowed $100,000 from
Pentico, secured by a deed of trust and guaranteed by Madsen and
Brough, principals of Mad-Wyler. The note bore interest at ten percent
per annum before default and at twelve percent on past due amounts.
For the first nine months, the note was payable at $1,000 monthly, appli-
cable to principal, and thereafter at $2,000 per month, including both
principal and interest. The note was due and payable in somewhat less
than four years.
For the first fourteen months, Mad-Wyler made only one payment on
time. Typically, most payments were a week or more late. Beginning
nine months into the loan, payments were late and not made in full. Pen-
tico sent Mad-Wyler an amortization schedule and a demand letter, ask-
ing for payments to be brought current. Unfortunately for Pentico, the
amortization schedule grossly miscalculated the late payments. Mad-
Wyler sued for usury. After the lawsuit, Pentico fixed the amortization
schedule. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Mad-Wyler's mo-
tion was granted. 135
Pentico's first defense against usury was that the mistaken charges
were the result of "accidental and bona fide error. ' 136 Pentico's argu-
ment failed to persuade the court. The court held that "[mierely brushing
the miscalculation aside as 'erroneous' and presenting arguments based
on the correct figure does not establish that the issue is settled as a matter
of law. 1' 37 The necessary evidence of the accident or error must exist,
but it did not in this case.
Pentico then argued that the "spreading doctrine" covered the late
charges and other interest, and had to be applied before finding usury. 138
A finding of usury requires (i) a loan, (ii) an absolute obligation to repay
principal, and (iii) the exaction of a greater compensation than allowed
by law. 139 The court stated that usury statutes are penal in nature and
must be strictly construed. The purpose of the usury statute is to penalize
those who intentionally charge legally excessive interest.140
In this case, the note contained a savings clause which reflected, ac-
cording to the court, an intent by the parties to comply with the usury
laws and indicated that the spreading of interest should be used to avoid a
133. 956 S.W.2d at 572 (citing Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d
324, 333 & n.6 (Tex. 1984)).
134. 964 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
135. See id. at 711.
136. Id. at 713.
137. Id.
138. Pentico, 964 S.W.2d at 714.
139. See id. at 714.
140. See id. at 714.
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charge of usury. 141 Interestingly, there is no mention of "spreading" in
the savings clause. Unless the contract is usurious on its face, the savings
clause must be given effect and enforced to avoid violation of the usury
laws. 142
Mad-Wyler argued that the spreading doctrine was inapplicable for
several reasons. One of those reasons related to an alleged misidentifica-
tion of the note in the deed of trust. This argument was rejected by the
court.143 Mad-Wyler's second argument was that spreading could not be
applied using the full note term until the loan was paid in full. The court
was not persuaded by this argument either, citing a number of cases
where the doctrine was applied in the middle of the term for the full
term. 1 44 Only if the loan is actually paid off before maturity can spread-
ing occur over a shorter term. Finally, the court noted that spreading may
be applicable even if the note is usurious on its face.' 45
Pentico raised the issue of whether the late charges made on the note
were treated as interest. The court held these late charges were interest,
and that they needed to be added to the agreed upon interest to deter-
mine whether there was usury.146 Mad-Wyler argued that the spreading
statute should not be applied to late charges. It based its argument on
Fisher v. Westinghouse Credit Corporation.47 In that case, for a reason
that is unclear, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a late fee that is
computed as interest on past due interest, accruing daily, and not a one-
time charge, is to be tested for usury separate from any underlying con-
tract.148 The Pentico court disagreed with that analysis, stating: "After
reading the cases cited in support of this unique proposition, and noting
that no other courts of appeal have adopted it, we decline to follow
Fischer."' 49
In looking at the various summary judgment issues raised by Pentico
(the lender), the court pondered some other weighty issues. The first was
an argument by Mad-Wyler that the compounding of interest (charging
interest on interest) is per se usurious. The court replied, "Appellees cite
no authority to support this tortured definition.' 150 Indeed, com-
pounding is allowed, subject to the overall usury limits.
Mad-Wyler's final argument was that Pentico had charged late pay-
ment interest during a so-called interest-free period. The borrower was
authorized to make payments by depositing a properly stamped and ad-
dressed check into a mailbox. Thus, the date the check went into the mail
was the date it was considered paid, not the date the check was received.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 715.
144. See id.
145. See Pentico, 969 S.W.2d at 715.
146. See id. at 716.
147. 760 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
148. See id. at 807.
149. 964 S.W.2d at 716.
150. Id. at 717.
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Here, even if we assume authorization to make payment by mail, there
was no evidence in the record of the date on which the checks were actu-
ally put into the mail, thus there was no evidence of an "interest free
period."151
V. LENDER LIABILITY
In First American Title Insurance Co. of Texas v. Willard,152 Willard
received financing from Henderson Savings and Loan (the Bank) in or-
der to build a home. In connection with the construction loan, the Bank
obtained an interim construction binder from First American, issued
through Pearson Abstract. Because of a search error, the binder failed to
note the presence of a Lone Star Gas easement. When the house was
half finished, it was learned that the gas lines went directly underneath
the house. The Bank ceased funding the loan and construction stopped
until the situation was resolved.
At the Bank's request, First American honored its obligations under
the binder and issued a policy, taking no exception for the easement. The
Bank then resumed funding the loan and the house was completed with
the gas line still in place. Both Willard and Lone Star sued the Bank and
First American.
One issue raised by Lone Star was that the Bank had engaged in a
trespass over the easement by renewing its funding and allowing the
house to be completed. The Bank's trespass, argued Lone Star, was not
direct, but consisted of aiding and abetting Willard in his trespass. The
court held that the Bank was liable, even though the Bank did not own
the property or have the authority to order the removal of the easement
or the destruction of the house.153 Instead of exercising an option that
would have resulted in eliminating the trespass, the Bank received an in-
demnity from Willard and a title policy and allowed the trespass to con-
tinue. Thus, the court held there was sufficient evidence that the
completion of the house and continuation of the trespass (instead of re-
quiring the elimination of the encroachment) was the Bank's intentional
decision that aided and assisted Willard's trespass on the easement. 154
VI. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Kessler v. Fanning5 5 involved statements made in connection with sell-
ing a home. In connection with buying a house, the Fannings received the
required Property Condition Disclosure Statement. With respect to the
questions on the statement about improper drainage or previous struc-
ture repairs, the sellers had answered "no." No other statements about
drainage or structure appeared to have been made by the sellers. The
151. See id. at 719.
152. 949 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, writ denied).
153. See id. at 350.
154. See id.
155. 953 S.W.2d 515, (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet. h.).
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Fannings had the house inspected and the inspector detected no drainage
problems, even though it was raining at the time of the inspection. After
moving into the house, the Fannings noticed drainage problems. They
sued the sellers, alleging Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA) violations.
The first question on appeal was whether any statement by the sellers
was the producing cause of the Fannings' injury. To recover under the
DTPA, the consumer must prove that the deceptive act was the produc-
ing cause of damages. 156 The Fannings testified that if they had known of
the drainage problem they would not have purchased the house. The sell-
ers claimed that the inspection of the property by the Fannings was an
intervening factor that broke the causal connection. The court held in
favor of the Fannings on the issue of producing cause. 157 The possibility
of an independent investigation that might uncover fraud does not pre-
clude recovery of damages for fraudulent misrepresentations.1 58
The second question was whether the statutorily required disclosure
statement contained misrepresentations of fact or was merely a statement
of opinion. The form stated that it was "not a substitute for inspections
or warranties" and that it contained "representations made by the
owner(s) based on owner's knowledge."'159 The sellers claimed that these
statements showed that the disclosures were merely statements of opin-
ion or "puffing," and not actionable misrepresentations. Whether a state-
ment is an opinion depends on (i) the specificity versus vagueness of the
statement, (ii) the comparative knowledge of the parties, and (iii)
whether the representation pertains to a past or a future condition.160
The court held that the disclosure statement was not vague or based on
equivalent knowledge by the parties, and pertained to past, as opposed to
future, conditions. 61 Thus, the statement amounted to a misrepresenta-
tion, rather than merely a statement of opinion.
Pairett v. Gutierrez'62 also dealt with DTPA claims. In connection with
the sale of their residence, the sellers delivered a Property Condition Dis-
closure Statement that contained a representation that the seller was not
aware of any defects or malfunctions in the foundation. The buyer had
the right to conduct an inspection, but did not have the foundation in-
spected. The contract contained a provision that the buyer accepted the
property "as-is." When foundation defects were later discovered, the
buyer sued the seller.
Under the DTPA, a seller has no duty to disclose defects of which the
seller is unaware.' 63 However, a seller is required to disclose material
156. See id. at 518.
157. See id. at 519.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 520.
161. See id.




facts that would not be discoverable by the buyer in the exercise of ordi-
nary care and due diligence. To obtain summary judgment in this case,
the seller would have to show conclusively that (1) he or she had no
knowledge of the defect and (2) the defect was discoverable by the buy-
ers in the exercise of ordinary care. 64 Here, the sellers presented only
their affidavits stating that they had no knowledge of the defects. These
affidavits were contradicted by other evidence raised by the buyer. Thus,
material fact questions precluded summary judgment.165
The sellers did not prevail on the "as-is" issue either. The provision
stated that the buyer accepted the property in its present condition sub-
ject only to repairs required after inspection and that failure to require
repairs was a waiver of repair rights. The court, relying on Smith v. Le-
vine,166 held that this particular "as-is" clause was silent on the issue of
whether the representations made in the Property Condition Disclosure
Statement could be relied upon by the buyer. 167 In addition, the court
noted that the contract did not contain the phrase "as-is" in relation to
the foundation and the overall condition of the house. 168 Thus, the con-
tract did not negate reliance on the seller's misrepresentations.
In Elizondo v. Gomez,169 Elizondo claimed that Gomez agreed to sell
him part of her property for $75,000. He paid a $5,000 down payment,
and the parties wrote a receipt on a restaurant "guest check" that read: "I
Jesse Elizondo have paid Mr. & Mrs. Leo Gomez $5000.00 for the Real
Estate property located on 1105 Ferndale city of San Antonio, Tex. ' '170
No deed was ever delivered to Elizondo. He sued for specific perform-
ance, claiming that the guest check receipt was a quasi-deed establishing
his right to the property as a matter of law.
To satisfy the statute of frauds for the sale of property, an agreement
must be in writing, signed by the person charged with the agreement or
someone authorized by him or her, and adequately describe the prop-
erty.171 Here, the alleged "quasi-deed" did not satisfy the statute of
frauds.172 First, the property description was wholly inadequate. The
property consisted of three lots, each with different addresses; the docu-
ment referred only to one address. Second, the document did not set out
the entire purchase price.
Partial performance may remove an oral contract from the statute of
frauds, however. The three requirements to remove the contract from
the statute of frauds are (i) payment of the consideration; (ii) possession
by the purchaser; and (iii) the making of valuable improvements with the
164. See id.
165. See id. at 516.
166. 911 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
167. See Pairett, 969 S.W.2d at 517..
168. See id.
169. 957 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
170. Id. at 863.
171. See id. at 863.
172. See id. at 864.
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seller's permission, or some other facts that would make the transaction a
fraud on the purchaser if it were not enforced. 173 Here, Elizondo made
the down payment and made monthly mortgage payments for four
months, until Gomez interfered. Elizondo also moved onto the property.
Thus, the court found that the case fell within the equitable doctrine of
partial performance and the oral contract was enforceable. 174 The court
did not mention the making of valuable improvements or the presence of
other facts making the seller's actions fraudulent.
In Graves v. Diehl175 the Graves and the Diehls lived across the road
from each other in rural Santa Fe, Texas. At some point, the Diehls built
an unpaved airstrip on their property, which Diehl and some of his
friends used. The Graves sued the Diehls, claiming the airstrip was a nui-
sance because of excessive noise and dangerous conditions. The Diehls
claimed that the Graves had no ownership interest in their property be-
cause the Diehls were buying the property pursuant to a contract for
deed, which does not transfer any property rights. The court held that the
Graves had sufficient interest in the property to maintain a nuisance
action. 176
In Salinas v. Beaudrie,177 the purchasers of property in this case were
not fluent in English. They entered into two contracts for deed with the
seller, which were written in English. The contract stated that the prop-
erty was not subdivided and that the purchaser was responsible for com-
plying with all applicable subdivision regulations. Because the property
was not subdivided, the purchasers could not get a building permit.
The purchasers defaulted on the payments due under the contracts, and
the seller sought to retake possession of the property. The purchasers
sued. Among the issues at the trial were whether the contracts were re-
quired to have been written in Spanish and whether, because of the pur-
chasers' lack of fluency in English, the seller had a duty of good faith and
fair dealing that somehow relieved the purchasers from the obligation to
read and understand the contract.
Texas Property Code section 5.093 requires certain purchase contracts
to be written in Spanish if the negotiations leading to the contract were
conducted primarily in Spanish.178 Unfortunately for the purchasers, this
requirement was not effective until two years after they entered into their
contracts.179
As to the duty to read the contract, the court held for the seller.180
Here, the record did not indicate that the transaction was not bargained
for at arm's length or that the seller engaged in any false representations
173. See id.
174. See Elizondo, 957 S.W.2d at 865.
175. 958 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.).
176. See id. at 473.
177. 960 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).
178. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.093 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
179. See Salinas, 960 S.W.2d at 319.
180. See id. at 320.
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or active trickery. The fact that the purchasers may not have been fluent
in English did not of itself create such a confidential relationship as to
relieve the purchasers from the obligation to read the contract docu-
ments. In fact, there was evidence that the contracts were translated for
the benefit of the purchaser by a paralegal in the seller's attorney's office.
In Abraham Investment Co. v. Payne Ranch, Inc.,181 Payne owned a
ranch in West Texas. At one point, Payne granted Campbell a right of
first refusal to purchase the ranch on the same terms offered to a third
party. Abraham Investment Company (AIC) entered into a contract
with Payne to purchase the property for cash. The contract was subject to
the right of first refusal in favor of Campbell. Payne sent notice to Camp-
bell, who expressed his desire to purchase the property. In the course of
discussing the purchase, Campbell and the seller agreed that Campbell
could purchase the property for a cash down payment and a note for the
balance. Following Campbell's purchase of the property, AIC sued
Campbell and Payne.
A right of first refusal is a right granted to a party giving it the first
opportunity to purchase property when the owner decides to sell. 182
Once the owner conveys the terms of the offer to the holder of the right
of first refusal, the rightholder has the power to accept or reject the of-
fer.183 Thus, at the moment notice is sent to the rightholder, the right of
first refusal ripens into an option. The terms of that option are formed by
the provisions granting the right and by the notice of intent to sell. Once
the property owner has given his or her notice of intent to sell, he or she
cannot change the terms of the offer as long as the option is binding upon
the property owner. Thus, Campbell's acceptance of the offer, or exercise
of the option created by the notice of offer, was improper and not a valid
exercise of his right of first refusal.184
AIC sought specific performance of its contract with Payne. A pur-
chaser is entitled to specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
when the contract is valid and enforceable. 185 If the seller breaches a
contract for the sale of land and subsequently sells the land to another
purchaser who has knowledge of the previous contract, then the subse-
quent purchaser stands in the shoes of the original seller when specific
performance is sought and may be compelled to convey title to the first
purchaser. 186 Because Campbell had not properly exercised his right of
first refusal, his purchase of the property was not by virtue of his right of
first refusal, and he was merely a subsequent purchaser with knowledge
of the AIC contract. Consequently, AIC was entitled to specific perform-
181. 968 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
182. See id. at 524.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 526.
185. See id. at 527 (citing Goode v. Westside Developers, Inc., 258 S.W.2d 844, 845-46




ance of the contract. 187
VII. DTPA
The case of Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corporation188
deals with the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA). When Perry Equipment Corporation (PECO) considered buy-
ing all of the stock of Maloney Pipeline Systems (Maloney), it required
Maloney to provide it with a set of audited financial statements. Maloney
hired Arthur Andersen, which conducted an audit and gave Maloney a
"clean bill of health." PECO then bought the Maloney stock but soon
discovered that Maloney was in terrible financial shape. Ultimately,
PECO wrote off the entire investment. PECO sued Arthur Anderson,
alleging DTPA violations, among other things.
Arthur Andersen claimed that PECO was not a "consumer," the
threshold status for bringing a DTPA claim. A consumer is one "who
seeks or acquires goods or services by purchase or lease. 1 89 Without
elaborating on the fact that Maloney, not PECO, had hired Arthur An-
dersen, the court held that, because it was a condition of the sale that
Maloney provide financial statements and because Maloney hired Arthur
Andersen, PECO was a consumer as to Arthur Andersen.1 90
The next question in the case was whether the transaction involved the
acquisition of goods and services. Arthur Andersen argued that the
transaction was for the sale of stock, which is not a good. Furthermore,
services are defined by the DTPA as "services furnished in connection
with the sale or repair of goods." The court held that the transaction was,
nonetheless, the purchase of services. 191 Arthur Andersen's audit was
not merely incidental to the sale by Maloney to PECO, it was required by
PECO and central to PECO's decision to buy Maloney. 192
In First National Bank of Durant v. Trans Terra Corporation Interna-
tional.,193 the same negligent misrepresentation cause of action was ap-
plied to allow a lender to sue a borrower's lawyer.194
The case of Brown v. Bank of Galveston, N.A. 195 dealt with the issue of
"producing a cause" in a DTPA suit. Vincent Brown married Hyacinth in
Jamaica, then moved back to Galveston, leaving her behind. In Galves-
ton, Brown contracted with a builder to build a house. The bank financed
the house. Problems arose, so the builder walked off the job. The bank,
which was monitoring progress on the house, sent letters to the builder,
itemizing deficiencies, among other things.
187. See id.
188. 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
189. See id. at 851 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 17.45(4)).
190. See id.
191. See id. (quoting TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 17.45(2)).
192. See id.
193. 142 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998).
194. See id. at 806.
195. 963 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1998).
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Brown later sued the Bank, alleging that it had violated the DTPA.
Assuming, without deciding, that Brown was a consumer, the court held
that Brown failed to prove the bank was the producing cause of any in-
jury.196 Producing cause requires a person to be a substantial factor in
producing injuries. 197 The periodic inspections of the property and send-
ing letters to try to settle disputes could not be logically considered a
cause of damages. The failure of the bank to pay subcontractors was not
a cause either, because the duty to pay them was the builder's, not the
bank's.
Brown also argued that the bank represented that it had more rights
than it actually did by insisting on payment in full before the house was
finished. The note provided the bank with several options to enforce the
obligations. The court held that there is no DTPA violation for beginning
foreclosure when the document permits the bank to complete the
construction. 198
Kinnard v. Circle K Stores, Inc.199 deals with lottery tickets in the
DTPA context. Kinnard bought tickets at a Circle K store for the January
2, 1993, lotto drawing. According to Kinnard, the clerk mishandled one
of the tickets that Kinnard intended to buy and the intended numbers
were not registered with the Lottery Commission. Unfortunately, that
ticket contained all six winning numbers. Kinnard said she failed to
check her tickets before leaving the store because it was crowded.
Kinnard sued Circle K for negligence and violation of the DTPA.200
The trial court granted summary judgment for Circle K.20 1 The court of
appeals upheld the summary judgment. 20 2 The lottery rules place the
"exclusive responsibility" for checking the accuracy of lottery numbers
with the person buying the ticket.203 The plain meaning of "exclusive
responsibility" bars recovery for negligence, as do the mechanics of the
lottery, which is intended to create an efficient way of filling the public
till.204 The lottery purchaser is in a much better position to verify lotto
numbers than a busy clerk.205 And the court held, "it is difficult to be-
lieve the Texas Lottery Commission would expect the retailer to insure
against a multimillion dollar miscue when the retailer's profit margin on a
ticket is five cents on the dollar. '20 6 The most compelling reason for re-
jecting the claim is that allocating responsibility in this manner "discour-
ages temptation. '20 7
196. See id. at 514.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. 966 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
200. See id. at 615.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 618.
203. See id. at 616.
204. See id.
205. See id.




The DTPA claim failed as well.2°8 To prevail on a DTPA claim, Kin-
nard must be a "consumer. '20 9 This means she must show that she sought
to acquire goods or services by lease or purchase. 210 A lottery ticket is an
intangible; it is neither a good nor a service, therefore she was not pro-
tected by the DTPA.2 11
The dissent pointed out that the cases exonerating lottery ticket sales-
people all involve authorized sellers.212 Here, the clerk who sold the
ticket was, in fact, a person who had never been trained to sell the tickets
and who was selling them in violation of the law. In light of this, the
dissent concludes, the court should not be bound by cases involving au-
thorized sales.213
VIII. LEASES
In the unanimous decision of Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Pali-
sades Plaza, Inc.,214 with the opinion written by Justice Rose Spector, the
Texas Supreme Court announced that: "[w]e hold today that a landlord
has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. ' 215 The tradi-
tional common law rule is that landlords have no duty to mitigate dam-
ages. 2 16 This rule stems from the concept that a lease is an estate in real
property, owned by the tenant during the term of the lease.217 As long as
the tenant has the right to possess the estate, the tenant has the obligation
to pay rent.218 The landlord has no duty, should the tenant abandon the
premises, to mitigate. 219 Texas has always followed this rule.220 In fact,
the opinion of the court of appeals said: "Last time I checked the law, it
was that a landlord doesn't have any obligation to try to fill the space."' 221
The Texas Supreme Court noted that forty-two states now have im-
posed on the landlord an obligation to mitigate. 222 Only six states have
explicitly held otherwise. Those states requiring mitigation have recog-
nized that leases have changed from their nature as primarily real prop-
erty to their current status as commercial contracts.223 Recognizing
leases as primarily commercial contracts allows a court to impose the
same rules to leases that otherwise apply to commercial contracts. Fur-
208. See id. at 617.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 618.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997).
215. Id. at 294.





221. Id. at 295 (quoting Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 938
S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1995), rev'd, 948 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1997)).
222. See id. at 296.
223. See id. at 297.
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ther, mitigation discourages economic waste and encourages productive
use of the property. Thus, the court said: "[w]e therefore recognize that a
landlord has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages when
the tenant breaches the lease and abandons the property, unless the com-
mercial landlord and tenant contract otherwise. '224
The court then considered the practical application of the duty to miti-
gate.225 It required the landlord to use objectively reasonable efforts to
fill the premises when the tenant vacates in breach of the lease.22 6 This is,
furthermore, not an absolute duty, and does not give the tenant a cause of
action against the landlord for failure to mitigate. Failure to use reason-
able efforts to mitigate merely bars recovery of damages to the extent
that damages reasonably could have been avoided.2 27 In addition, the
tenant bears the burden of proving failure to mitigate. 228
Finally, the court considered the situations in which the duty actually
existed. In Texas, a landlord typically has four causes of action for breach
of a lease.229 First, the landlord can maintain the lease and sue for
rents.230 Second, the landlord can treat the breach as an anticipatory
breach, repossess, and sue for the present value of rentals reduced by the
reasonable market value of the property for the remainder of the term.231
Third, the landlord can treat the breach as an anticipatory breach, repos-
sess, relet the property, and sue the tenant for the difference between the
contractual rent and the amount received from the new tenant. Fourth,
the landlord can treat the breach as a forfeiture of the lease and relieve
the tenant of his or her future obligation to pay rents.232
The Texas Supreme Court said the landlord must have a duty to miti-
gate when he or she treats the lease as an anticipatory repudiation be-
cause it is essentially a contractual action.233 The court then tackled the
troubling problem of the landlord treating the lease as remaining in effect
and suing for rents. To require the landlord to mitigate in that instance
would force the landlord to reenter the premises and thereby risk termi-
nating the lease or accepting the tenant's surrender. The court held, in
those situations, mitigation is required only if (i) the landlord actually
reenters, or (ii) the lease allows the landlord to reenter the premises with-
out accepting surrender, forfeiting the lease, or being construed as evict-
ing the tenant.234
Cash America International, Inc. v. Hampton Place, Inc.235 is another











235. 955 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1997, pet. denied).
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landlord-tenant case. The landlord sued the tenant for anticipatory
breach of a lease, seeking the traditional measure of damages, i.e., the
difference between the current value of the income stream and the fair
market value of the premises for the remainder of the term. The tenant
sought jury instructions on mitigation of damages, but the trial court did
not submit them.
On appeal, the court noted the recent Austin Hill County case, holding
that the Texas Supreme Court's opinion required the instructions on miti-
gation to be submitted to the jury.236 The landlord argued that, because
the trial court deducted the present rental value of the premises for the
remainder of the term, the tenant had already received credit for any
damages incurred by the landlord's failure to mitigate. The court held
that the jury was required to reduce damages not only by the reasonable
cash market value of the premises, but by the amount that could have
been avoided by mitigation.237 The court stated: "This additional instruc-
tion permits the jury to weigh evidence of the amount of money, if any,
lost by the landlord's failure to exercise reasonable care in maintaining
and managing the property, which would reduce the cash market value of
the lease and thus reduce the damages owed the landlord. '238
The case of Marroquin v. D&N Funding239 addresses the use of a tem-
porary injunction when bankruptcy is pending. The Marroquins lived in a
house they had previously owned. To "borrow" money against their
homestead, the Marroquins engaged in a few transactions to sell and refi-
nance the house. After the last sale and refinancing, they continued to
live in the house, but their default on the loan caused a foreclosure. Af-
ter the foreclosure, Mrs. Marroquin filed bankruptcy. Without knowing
about the bankruptcy, the lender filed an FED action to evict the Marro-
quins. The Marroquins sought and obtained a temporary restraining or-
der against the FED proceeding, initially not informing the district court
of the pending bankruptcy. At the temporary injunction hearing, the
Marroquins informed the district court that Mrs. Marroquin had filed
bankruptcy. The court heard the case anyway and denied the temporary
injunction.240 The Marroquins appealed the denial.
A temporary injunction will not be granted when there is an adequate
remedy at law.241 Here, the Marroquins could have informed the justice
court that there was a bankruptcy pending, invoking the automatic stay.
That would have been as good a remedy as an injunction since the auto-
matic stay would have prohibited the issuance of an eviction order.242
Since the bankruptcy stay afforded the same protection as an injunction,
236. See id. at 162-63.
237. See id. at 413.
238. Id. at 463.
239. 943 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
240. See id. at 114.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 115.
1420 [Vol. 52
REAL PROPERTY
the Marroquins had an adequate remedy at law.243
The court, in Carlson's Hill Country Beverage v. Westinghouse Road
Joint Venture,244 held that a landlord was restricted as to his damage re-
covery against a tenant in a forcible detainer action. In a de novo appeal
of a forcible detainer action, the county court found that the tenant failed
to maintain insurance, pay rent, or cure the breaches within the permitted
time period. 245 The court awarded possession of the property to the land-
lord and awarded $14,000 for rent, $5,267.50 in prorated taxes, $20 for a
returned check fee, and $14,200 in attorneys' fees. 24 6 The tenant argued
that the county court exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding these amounts
because the appellate jurisdiction of the county court is confined to the
jurisdictional limits of the justice court.
A justice court has original exclusive jurisdiction in a detainer action,
the subject of which is limited to issues of possession.247 A claim for un-
paid rent can be joined, subject to the jurisdictional limits of the justice
court-in this case $5,000.248 An appeal from the justice court is avail-
able by way of a de novo action in the county court.249 Rule 752 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits damage claims related to main-
taining or obtaining possession of the premises during pendency of the
appeal. 250 Such damages include rents accruing during the pendency of
the appeal and reasonable attorneys' fees in the justice court and the
county court. 251 Only the prevailing party in the county court is entitled
to recover damages. 25 2
The court of appeals held that the landlord was restricted to the juris-
dictional limits of the justice court for rentals accruing before judgment in
the justice court, and that the landlord was restricted by Rule 752 as to
other damages. 253 To recover under Rule 752, the landlord must be the
prevailing party and the damages must be related to maintaining or de-
fending possession of the premises during pendency of the appeal. 254 In
this case, this meant that the landlord could recover only (i) up to $5,000
as unpaid rent accruing before the judgment in the justice court; (ii) lost
rentals for the period of the appeal; (iii) lost property taxes for the period
of the appeal; and (iv) attorneys fees accrued in the justice court and the
county court, not limited by jurisdictional limits of the justice court.255
The court in Highlands Management Co. v. First Interstate Bank of
243. See id.
244. 957 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
245. See id. at 953.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 954 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R. Civ.
P. 746).
248. See id.
249. See id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 749, 571).





255. See id. at 255-56
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Texas, N.A. 256 held that a parking lot is included in a restriction covenant.
First Interstate sold property to Highlands. The deed included a restric-
tive covenant prohibiting Highlands from using its property for certain
endeavors, including sexually-oriented businesses. At the time of the
transaction, Highlands told First Interstate that it intended to use the
property as a barbecue restaurant; however, Highlands intended to lease
the property to provide excess parking for the adjacent landowner, the
operator of "The Country Club," a "gentlemen's cabaret."
First Interstate sued to enforce the restrictive covenant. Highlands
claimed that it was not violating the covenant. Highlands was leasing the
property as a parking lot and the sexually-oriented business was on the
neighboring property, not on the property being leased. The court held
that the parking lot was an integral part of the prohibited business. 257 In
fact, the gentlemen's cabaret would not be allowed to operate without the
parking located on the restricted tract.
In McCartney v. California Mortgage Service258 the court of appeals
held that the county court did not abuse its discretion by requiring a
$19,000 supersedeas bond for an appeal of a writ of possession, when the
occupants had maintained possession of the premises for four years with-
out making any mortgage or rental payments to the owner and there was
evidence that the owner would incur liability for property taxes, insur-
ance, and costs of repairs, and would lose valuable rights to sell the
property.259
In A. V.A. Services, Inc. v. Parts Industries Corp.,26°) A.V.A. appealed
from a county court forcible detainer judgment, which the court of ap-
peals dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 261 Section 24.007 of the Texas
Property Code provides that a final judgment for a forcible detainer ac-
tion may not be appealed on the issue of possession unless the premises
in question are being used for residential purposes. 262 A.V.A. contended
that there was no landlord-tenant relationship and that Parts was an un-
registered foreign corporation. The court of appeals had no jurisdiction
as to those claims, since they both involved the issue of possession. 263
The court relied upon Academy Corp. v. Sunwest N.O.P., Inc.264
In a concurring opinion well worth reading, Justice Burgess disagreed
with the holding that there was no jurisdiction to determine the existence
of the landlord-tenant relationship. 2 65 According to him, forcible de-
tainer exists only as to a person who is a holdover tenant, a tenant at will,
256. 956 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
257. See id. at 754.
258. 951 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, n.w.h.).
259. See id. at 550.
260. 949 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, n.w.h.).
261. See id. at 853.
262. TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 24.00 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1998).
263. See id.
264. 853 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
265. See 949 S.W.2d at 855.
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or a tenant at sufferance. 266 Without the existence of a landlord-tenant
relationship, there can be no forcible detainer.267 Thus, the court of ap-
peals should have jurisdiction to determine whether there was a basis
upon which the county court could determine possession.268 In showing
his dislike of the Academy Corp. case, Burgess wrote the following clever
bit:
A displaced and disgruntled Chicago Cubs fan could file a forcible
detainer action in the appropriate justice court in Harris County al-
leging he had a leasehold on the Astrodome from Harris County, the
owner; as landlord he had sublet the Astrodome to a tenant, the
Houston Astros Baseball Club, and, for whatever reason, the Astros
were a holdover tenant or a tenant at will or sufferance. The Astros
would defend, alleging they were in direct privy with Harris County
and thus a tenant of Harris County, not a tenant of the fan, therefore
no landlord-tenant relationship, no jurisdiction. The justice court
could, without evidence or against the evidence, render judgment for
the fan. Confident justice would prevail, the Astros would appeal to
one of the county courts at law of Harris County, once again assert-
ing no landlord-tenant relationship, no jurisdiction. All those jurists,
being avid Astro fans, would voluntarily recuse themselves and a vis-
iting judge from Dallas, an avid Rangers fan, would hear the de novo
appeal. This second court could, without evidence or against the evi-
dence, render judgment for the Cub fan and issue a writ of execution
ordering the Astros out. [Note: the Chicago fan has manipulated the
time sequence so a four game series between Chicago and Houston,
scheduled for the Dome, must now be moved to Wrigley Field]. A
virtual army of three-piece, pin-stripe-suited lawyers delve into legal
research with all the intenseness, vigor and resolve of an at bat by
Jeff Bagwell, Astro slugger and first baseman. They expect to find a
belt high, middle of the plate, fast ball,-i.e., although Section 24.007
precludes appellate review on the merits in a forcible detainer suit,
the statute does not prevent a court of appeals from determining
whether the county court had jurisdiction of the cause. Instead, they
find a low and outside the strike zone, curve ball,-i.e., proof that a
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties is just one of
the elements required to support a forcible detainer action, but this
proof is not jurisdictional; it is required to show who has the greater
right of possession and the question of possession is not reviewable
by a court of appeals (Academy Corp. v. Sunwest N.O.P., Inc.), To
add insult to injury, this "curve ball" is out of the very court of ap-
peals they must rely on for relief. However, unlike the great all-star










In Okpala v. Coleman,270 the tenant's discovery requests and responses
contained sufficient information to place at issue claims that were the ba-
sis of the landlord's FED action and thus constituted an answer sufficient
to prevent entry of a default judgment.271
IX. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In Bell v. State Department of Highways and Public Transportation,272
Bell brought a declaratory judgment action against the State for building
a highway across his land. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that
it was, in essence, a trespass to try title case and Bell did not have the
consent of the State to bring such an action.273 Bell claimed that a declar-
atory judgment was appropriate because the State was claiming title
based upon the adverse possession statutes, and the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act section 37.004(a), which provides a procedural remedy by way
of declaratory judgment for those affected by statutes. 274
Unfortunately, Bell's reading of the Declaratory Judgment Act was
completely wrong.2 75 Section 37.004(a) allows declaratory judgment ac-
tions to be brought to decide the validity or construction of a statute.276
Bell sought to have the statutes either construed or to invalidate them.
Trespass to try title is the proper means of determining title to property in
Texas, and no matter how Bell framed his arguments, he could not get
past the fact that he was merely asking for a determination of title.2 77
And, unfortunately again, one cannot bring a title lawsuit against the
State without its consent. 278
Green v. Parrack279 also deals with adverse possession, In this case, the
Greens lived next door to Parrack. A fence separating their property had
been in existence since 1969. Apparently, neither of the neighbors knew
that the fence was not located on the property line. The discrepancy was
discovered when the Greens built a new fence that did not line up with
the old one. In a prior lawsuit, Parrack sued the Greens claiming their
new fence encroached on her property. The basis for the encroachment
claim was Parrack's assertion of title to approximately eight inches of the
Greens' property along the common boundary by adverse possession.
Parrack lost her lawsuit.280
About three months later, even though she had lost her claim of own-
ership of the eight inch strip, Parrack tore down the old fence and built a
270. 964 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
271. See id. at 700.
272. 945 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
273. See id. at 293.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 294.
276. See id.
277. See id. (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 71; Hodge v. Smith, 856 S.W.2d 212, 214 n.1 (Tex.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
278. See id. (citing State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1961)).
279. 974 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
280. See id. at 202.
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new fence, expending a great deal of time and money, and encroaching
an additional thirteen and one half inches onto the Greens' property.
This time, the Greens sued Parrack to remove the fence. The trial court
held that Parrack was barred by res judicata from asserting the adverse
possession claim, but went on to state that "a good fence in south Texas
makes good neighbors and Ms. Parrack built a good fence that would be
expensive and difficult to remove," and refused recovery under the the-
ory of de minimus non curat lex.281 The trial court also held that the
Greens were barred by laches and unclean hands from complaining about
the new fence.282 The court of appeals upheld the finding of res judi-
cata.283 The issue of ownership of the eight inch strip inside the original
fence was fully adjudicated in the prior lawsuit.
Parrack's defense of laches was based upon the fact that the Greens
stood and watched her complete her fence before they filed suit. It ap-
pears that the Greens were somewhat intimidated by Parrack's boyfriend,
who had threatened them. They delayed taking action for over a year
after the fence was built. Still, laches requires (i) an unreasonable delay
in asserting a claim and (ii) a good faith and detrimental change of posi-
tion because of the delay. 284 Those requirements were not met here.285
The delay was not unreasonable and Parrack could not show any detri-
mental reliance on the delay. Furthermore, laches is not a defense to a
claim of title.286
Finally, the court rejected the "good fences make good neighbors" and
de minimus holdings of the trial court, finding that there was no legal
basis for the trial court's holding.287 The issue in this case was not the
quality of the fence but the integrity of the Greens' property rights. The
de minimus theory applies when the parties are haggling over a few pen-
nies here and there. 288 According to the court, there is no comparison
between cases invoking that theory and ones in which the damages at
issue consist of the loss of the use of almost two feet of private prop-
erty.289 Furthermore, the erroneous application of the de minimus doc-
trine in this case was exacerbated by Parrack's building the new fence in
blatant violation of the ruling in her prior lawsuit. She was aware that she
had no title in the property upon which she built the fence. Such disre-
spect for the law should not be rewarded through the use of an inapplica-
ble legal doctrine.290
In Amador v. Berrospe,291 an adverse possession claim did not succeed
281. Id. 205 (citing trial court).
282. See id. at 206.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 203-04.
285. See id. at 204.
286. See id.




291. 961 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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since there was no evidence that one tenant-in-common had ousted the
other from possession or repudiated title.2 92 Even though the tenant
claiming adverse possession had maintained insurance and paid taxes on
the property, such actions were not hostile to the other co-tenant and
therefore could not have put him on notice to an adverse possession
claim.29
3
X. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
Correction deeds are at issue in Sanchez v. Telles.294 Montoya pledged
a parcel of property as collateral for two bail bonds for her son-in-law.
At the time she signed the deed of trust, she did not claim the property as
a homestead, and there was never a designation of homestead recorded.
The deed of trust contained wording that represented the property was
not homestead and disclaimed any homestead in the property. The bond
was forfeited when the son-in-law jumped bond. After the bond forfei-
ture, Montoya signed a power-of-attorney in favor of her daughter. Her
daughter then sold the property to Sanchez, although neither Montoya's
signature nor her daughter's was on the deed.
Meanwhile, the bond agency foreclosed, and the property was sold to
Telles, who received a trustee's deed. After litigation had commenced in
this matter, Montoya and her daughter gave Sanchez a correction deed
which purported to correct the problem of not having the grantor sign the
original deed.
Sanchez claimed to be unaffected by the deed of trust because he was a
bona fide purchaser. He claimed that he purchased the property without
notice of the deed of trust. Unfortunately, his deed was signed by him-
self, not the grantor. He tried to overcome this shortcoming by relying on
the correction deed. Ordinarily, a correction deed relates back to the
execution of the original.295 Here, however, the original deed did not
contain the required signature of the grantor and should never have been
recorded. The failure of the seller to sign the original deed rendered it
void ab initio, thus, there was not a valid deed to correct.296
In Templeton v. Dreiss297 the court held that a conveyance did not re-
quire complete certainty. A deed executed in 1933 sought to convey an
"undivided interest" in a road. The road was not described in the deed,
although attached to and referenced in the deed was a survey that de-
picted the location of the road. The survey was not recorded with the
deed. Years later, the Templetons claimed ownership of all of the road,
alleging that the deed was void for uncertainty, based on the property
description and the use of the phrase "undivided interest."
292. See id. at 209.
293. See id.
294. 960 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, writ denied).
295. See id. at 768.
296. See id.
297. 961 S.W,2d 645 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
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To validly describe property for purposes of the statute of frauds, a
conveyance must, either within itself or by reference to some outside
writing, provide the means to identify the land with reasonable cer-
tainty.298 In this case, plenty of evidence existed that the road could be
identified from the survey attached to the deed. The Templetons claimed,
however, that the fact the deed was not recorded was fatal. The court
disagreed.299 It was not necessary that the map be recorded. When the
map is adequately referred to in the deed, it is usually to be considered
part of the instrument and construed in connection with it.30 0
The court also did not agree that the phrase "an undivided interest"
made the conveyance uncertain. The Templetons argued that the phrase
did not contain the means of determining the extent of ownership of the
road. The law allows, however, uncertain descriptions to be made certain
by intrinsic evidence when there is evidence in the deed that furnishes a
key or nucleus of a description that allows the extrinsic evidence to make
the uncertain certain. The law also does not require absolute mathemati-
cal certainty. 301
The case of Vasquez v. Vasquez30 2 deals with determining the rightful
owner of property. Before she died, Juanita executed a will naming Igna-
cio and Jose as her sole beneficiaries. About a year later, she signed a
quitclaim deed conveying her property to Brigido. Juanita gave the deed
to her attorney with instructions to tell no one about it until her death, at
which time the lawyer was supposed to deliver the deed to Brigido. The
lawyer did just that, sending the deed to Brigido right after Juanita died.
Later, the will was probated and Ignacio, as executor, executed a special
warranty deed of the same property to himself and Jose. As the court
aptly stated, "The question soon arose: who is the rightful owner of the
property in question?" 30 3
A deed must be delivered to be effective.3°4 In determining whether a
deed has been effectively delivered when placed in the control of a third
party, the question is whether the grantor parted with all dominion and
control over the instrument at the time she delivered it to the third party
with the intent that it take effect as a conveyance at the time of deliv-
ery.305 Here, there was no question that Juanita delivered the deed to the
lawyer with instructions for later delivery to Brigido. Her instructions did
not mention her power to recall the deed. When her attorney was asked
whether the instructions included any discussion of the right to recall the
deed, he responded, "Well, no. I keep the deed, and then I'm not to tell
298. See id. at 658 (citing Smith v. Sorrell, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. 1935)).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id. at 659.
302. 973 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).





anybody or file it or do anything until after they've spewed her ashes. 30 6
Ignacio and Juan claimed that Juanita had not surrendered complete
control of the instrument, as evidenced by her remaining on the property
until her death. The court held that when a grantor delivers a deed to a
third person with the intent to part with all control, yet retains possession,
the legal effect of the delivery of the deed is to convey the fee while re-
serving a life estate in the grantor. 30 7
Ignacio and Juan also pointed to testimony from Juanita's lawyer that
Juanita had the power to reclaim the deed. Essentially, the lawyer said
that if Juanita had asked him to return the deed to her, he would have.
The court said Juanita did have the power to reclaim the deed, but that
did not bear on the issue of her intent.3118 The only evidence bearing on
her intent was the actual delivery of the deed with the instruction to pass
it on upon her death.30 9
XI. EASEMENTS
Murphy v. Fannin County Electric Cooperative, Inc.310 held an electric
company liable for violating an unambiguous provision of an easement.
The owners' property was subject to an easement in favor of the Electric
Cooperative (Co-op). The easement specifically gave the Co-op the right
to cut and trim trees to keep them clear of power lines and to cut down
dead, weak, leaning, or dangerous trees that were tall enough to strike
the wires. A right of way crew for the Co-op cut down and poisoned 350
large trees on the owners' property over a period of three days. An ease-
ment is a form of contract and is to be interpreted by the court as a mat-
ter of law.31 1 The court held that there was no ambiguity in the easement
concerning poisoning-the electric company had no right to do SO. 3 1 2
The court found in favor of the electric company in Parks v. DeWitt
County Electric Cooperative, Inc.313 The easement was found to be am-
biguous as to the Co-op's right to cut down trees.314 The landowners
argued that the ambiguity should be resolved strictly against the Co-op,
which drafted the easement, but the court disagreed. 31 5 Under the land-
owner's analysis, an ambiguous contract would never be interpreted by
the trier of fact because it would always be interpreted against the maker
of the instrument. Therefore, the ambiguity was sent back to the jury for
a determination. 316




310. 957 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet).
311. See id. at 903 (citing Philips Natural Gas Co. v. Cardiff, 823 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.
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The court in Benedictine Sisters of the Good Shepherd v. Ellison317 held
that landlocked owners had established easement by necessity. In this
case, the Sisters and Ellison owned adjoining tracts. Record title to the
tracts originated from a 1925 partition decree. Texaco owned a substan-
tial part of the tract as tenant in common with other owners, although the
land was never actually used by Texaco. The common tract was parti-
tioned to various owners, and Ellison purchased his tract in 1954 from
entities other than Texaco. In 1993, Texaco gave the Sisters their tract, on
which they planned to build a monastery. The sisters sued Ellison, argu-
ing by necessity for an easement for access to a farm to market road. At
trial, the court refused to grant the easement.318
An easement by necessity is established with proof of: (1) unity of own-
ership of the dominant and servient estates prior to severance; (2) neces-
sity of a roadway; and (3) the existence of that necessity at the time of the
severance of the two estates. 319 Ellison argued that there was no unity of
ownership prior to severance. The court disagreed based on a broad in-
terpretation of this requirement and held that since the entire tract was
owned in common prior to partition, common ownership was suffi-
cient.320 The severance that occurred to allow the easement by necessity
was the partition.
Ellison then argued that there were at least two other landowners from
whom access to the Sisters' land could be obtained. Although that was
theoretically true, the facts showed that the only immediate access to a
public road was across Ellison's land. 321 Finally, Ellison argued that the
necessity did not exist before severance. The court held that it did be-
cause the public road had been in existence at the time of the partition.322
Scott v. Cannon323 addresses several issues regarding prescriptive ease-
ments. The Scotts and the Cannons were neighbors for more than thirty
years. The only access from the highway to the Scotts' property was a
roadway crossing two pieces of property owned by the Cannons. An un-
paved access to the Scotts' property was available from another public
road, but the access to the other highway had been the main access to the
Scotts' property for years. The Cannons had neither dedicated nor
granted an easement to the Scotts to use the road access. The Scotts did
not obtain their property as a severance from the Cannon property.
In 1996, Sprint asked the Cannons for the right to put a communica-
tions tower on their land. The Cannons refused, so Sprint went to the
Scotts, who granted the company permission to put the tower on their
land and told Sprint that it could use the access road across the Cannons'
property. The Cannons objected, claiming that the road was private and
317. 956 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
318. See id. at 631.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id at 632.
322. See id.
323. 959 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
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that the Scotts did not have authority to grant permission for its use. The
Cannons then had their lawyer send a letter to the Scotts terminating
permission to use the road.
The Scotts sued, seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment to
confirm their right to use the road. They claimed the road was a public
road by implied dedication and, alternatively, that they had acquired an
easement by estoppel, necessity, or prescription. The Cannons counter-
claimed, seeking a determination that the road was private and also seek-
ing an injunction.
A claimant can prove an implied dedication by showing: (1) the acts of
the landowner induced the belief that the landowner intended to dedicate
the road to public use; (2) the landowner owned the land in fee simple
and was competent to dedicate the road; (3) the public relied on these
acts and will be served by the dedication; and (4) there was an offer and
acceptance of the dedication. 324 The court failed to find an implied dedi-
cation of the road. 325 First, no public funds were ever expended in con-
nection with the road. All maintenance was paid for by the Cannons and
the Scotts. Second, the evidence of donative intent was merely that the
public used the road, and that was held insufficient as a matter of law.326
Third, the Cannons had made it clear for years that the road was a private
road. Finally, the road was used strictly to access the Cannons' and
Scotts' property-the public did not need to use this road.
The court also failed to find easement by estoppel. 327 An easement by
estoppel is created where a landowner makes representations about the
existence of an easement that are acted on by the easement claimant. 328
None of the elements of easement by estoppel was present in this case.
The court noted that the cases seem to require the existence of a vendor/
purchaser relationship to create such an easement. In addition, none of
the representations regarding the roadway made by the Cannons was
such that they would lead the Scotts to believe they were being given an
easement.
The claim of easement by necessity failed because the Scotts could
prove neither the element of unity of ownership nor that the easement
was absolutely necessary.329 The two parties purchased their tracts inde-
pendently and from separate sellers. Further, there was access across al-
ternate property.
The Scotts succeeded in showing an easement by prescription. 330 An
easement by prescription rests on the claimants' actions under a color of
right.331 To obtain a prescriptive easement, one must use someone else's
324. See id. at 718.
325. See id. at 719.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 720.
328. See id.





land in a manner that is open, notorious, continuous, exclusive, and ad-
verse for a period of ten years or more.332
As stated above, one element of a prescriptive easement is exclusiv-
ity. 333 The Cannons argued that because they used the road jointly with
the Scotts, the Scotts' use could not be exclusive and thus could not be
adverse. Exclusivity, however, is just one way of showing that a claim is
adverse; it is not the only way.334 It is usually invoked to show that, since
the claimant was not excluding the owner, the owner must somehow be
permitting the use.335 In this case there was other evidence of
adverseness.
In 1972, the Cannons told the Scotts that the road was private, yet the
Scotts continued to use it. Because no action was taken to stop the Scotts
from using the road after the Cannons made clear that their use violated
the private nature of the road, the court held there was an easement by
prescription. 336 But, unfortunately for the Scotts, the prescriptive use of
the road was just for the residence, and they had not obtained an ease-
ment that would allow the commercial use of the road by Sprint.337
XII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND CONDOMINIUMS
In the case of Pilarcik v. Emmons,338 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a restrictive covenant was unenforceable since it was ambiguous and
had been waived. Restrictive covenants in the subdivision prohibited
composition roofs, unless another material was permitted by the Archi-
tectural Control Committee (ACC). The original subdivision restrictive
covenants provided for an ACC, which had specific authority to approve
construction plans, among other things. All of the original members of
the committee were officers and employees of Dallas Federal Savings and
Loan. The ACC had long since been dormant when the Pilarciks bought
their house in 1992. Procedures were set out in the covenants for ob-
taining consent from the ACC, including a provision that, if no response
was received within thirty days, consent was deemed given.
At a homeowners association meeting, there was a disagreement sur-
rounding the Pilarciks' decision to roof using composition materials.
They were told that the shingles were prohibited. After the meeting, the
Pilarciks sent letters to the original ACC members requesting permission
to use the materials. The letters were sent to the fourteen-year-old ad-
dresses of the members, and all of the letters were returned as undeliver-
able. Later, the Pilarciks located two of the members of the ACC who
had not resigned and succeeded in procuring from them a waiver of the
composition roof restriction. A group of homeowners sued the Pilarciks
332. See id.
333. See id.
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after they started their roofing job. The court of appeals held in favor of
the other homeowners. 339 The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 340
The restrictions contained three provisions regarding roofs. First, roofs
of composition type shingles were not be permitted. Second, all roofs had
to be wood shingle unless an alternate roofing material was approved by
the ACC. Third, the ACC had the right to waive any restriction insofar as
it related to type of roof. The court held that the restrictions were unam-
biguous and clearly gave the ACC the power to allow an owner to use
composition roofs. 34 1
In addition, the court held that the restrictions had effectively been
waived. 342 All of the old ACC members had resigned, except the two
who had signed off on the roof. The restrictions provided that the re-
maining ACC members had the authority to waive restrictions. Further,
even though the Pilarciks did not comply with all of the procedures for
obtaining ACC approval, the fact that they actually received the approval
made those procedures irrelevant. 343
Munson v. Milton3 " deals with the operation of a bed and breakfast in
a subdivision that prohibits the operation of a business. Property in the
subdivision was restricted as follows: "All tracts within the Chisum's sub-
division shall be used solely for residential, camping or picnicing purposes
and shall never be used for business purposes. Motel, tourist courts, and
trailer parks shall be deemed to be a business use."'345 The Munsons
owned a house in the subdivision that they rented to vacationers as a bed
and breakfast, for short periods of usually no more than five days. The
neighbors sued and obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting this use
of the property. In attacking the temporary injunction, the Munsons first
argued that the trial court failed to find an irreparable injury. The court
of appeals held that, when seeking a temporary injunction, the applicant
need not show irreparable injury.346 Instead, the applicant is required
only to show that the defendant intends to perform an act that would
violate the restrictive covenant.347
The Munsons then argued that the plaintiffs failed to show that the use
of the property violated the restriction. The court examined the meaning
of the term "residence" and found that it requires both a physical pres-
ence and an intention to remain.348 If a person comes to a place tempo-
rarily, without any intention of making that place his or her home, that
place is not considered to be the person's residence. 349 The court noted
339. See id. at 477.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 478.
342. See id. at 479.
343. See id.
344. 948 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
345. See id. at 815.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 816.
349. See id. at 817.
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the distinction in the Texas Property Code between residences and tran-
sient housing (such as hotels, motels, and inns). 350 The court noted the
distinction made in the restriction itself was between personal and busi-
ness uses. Ultimately, the court held that there was a probable violation
of the restriction, although it restructured the injunction to prohibit only
non-residential renting of the property.351
Finally, the Munsons argued that the injunction constituted an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation of their property; the court disagreed. As
modified, the injunction imposed a reasonable restraint.352
In his dissent, Justice Duncan thought the restriction did not prohibit
the Munsons' use of the property.353 At the very least, he would have
found the restriction ambiguous and resolved the interpretation in favor
of the free use of the property.
The effect of a restrictive covenant on a church is addressed in Tien Tao
Association, Inc. v. Kingsbridge Park Community Association, Inc.354
Tien Tao is a non-profit religious organization. Two members of the
church purchased houses in Kingsbridge and subsequently conveyed
them to the church. Kingsbridge was subject to restrictive covenants,
usually enforced by the Architectural Control Committee (ACC). After
acquiring the houses, the church made several changes to their exteriors
without seeking permission from the ACC for the changes. In addition,
the houses were used by visitors and worshipers, which seemed to in-
crease the traffic in the neighborhood. The ACC began an inspection
process and sent a series of letters to the church requesting compliance
with the restrictions. The church complied with some requests, but for
the most part objected to the authority of the ACC to enforce the restric-
tions. A permanent injunction was issued requiring the church to comply
with the restrictions.355
The church first argued that the restrictions governed the architectural
structure of the properties but not their use. The court reviewed the re-
strictions and found enough references to the use restriction to hold that
they restricted use as well as structure.356
The church then argued that it had no notice of the guidelines by which
the ACC administered the restrictive covenants. The church admitted to
having a copy of the restrictions. The restrictions gave the ACC authority
to promulgate the guidelines. By making clear the existence of an ACC
and that the ACC was authorized to establish building standards, the re-
strictions had provided adequate notice to the church to approach the
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The church then argued public policy reasons against enforcing the re-
strictions. It contended that the federal Fair Housing Act makes it unlaw-
ful to deny or make available a dwelling to any person because of
religion. The court did not think the enforcement of restrictive covenants
in this case abridged freedom of worship.358 The repercussions of the
church's actions were identical to what would have happened as a result
of any non-residential use. The high traffic, noise, and eyesores on the
property created a nuisance, and the fact that the nuisance resulted from
a religious gathering did not exclude it from coverage by the restrictions.
The restrictions may have had an impact on how the worshipers worship,
but that did not equal to religious discrimination.
Finally, the church argued that the restrictions violated constitutional
rights of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of associa-
tion. This argument failed because the church did not plead these consti-
tutional defenses, but instead incorrectly claimed that the burden of
proving constitutionality was on the homeowners' association.359
The court held that using a trailer as a house made it a "trailer house"
in Cox v. Melson-Fulsom. 360 Fulsom and Cox both owned lake lots in the
same subdivision. The lots were restricted, including a prohibition
against trailer houses. After Cox bought her lot, she moved a travel
trailer onto it and left it there. In addition to being parked on the lot, the
trailer was hooked up to the electricity and contained food and blankets
so a person could spend the night in it. The trial court found that the
trailer fit the definition of "trailer house" in the restrictions and granted
an injunction. 361
The definition of a trailer is well settled in Texas.362 Cox's vehicle,
which has wheels, a hitch, and a living area, fits within the plain meaning
of the term. Cox claimed that, even if it is a "trailer," it is not a "trailer
house." The court noted that Cox was using the trailer as a house, and
that was enough to make it a trailer house. 363
Northwest Park Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Brundrett,364 the
court held that a suit for assessments under a subdivision declaration is
not a suit on an open account that is entitled to the benefits of Rule 185
of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. 365
Several issues with regard to restrictive covenants and condominiums
were addressed in Dickerson v. DeBarbieres.366 Palm Gardens Condo-
miniums were formed in 1977 pursuant to a declaration that gave the
Owner's Association a lien for unpaid assessments and provided that the
358. See id. at 531.
359. See id. at 533.
360. 956 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.).
361. See id. at 792.
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364. 970 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied.).
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366. 964 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
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lien could be foreclosed in the same manner as a foreclosure of a mort-
gage or deed of trust. The declaration did not name a trustee or set out
any procedures for foreclosing. About ten years later, the Association
amended its by-laws to authorize appointment of a trustee to conduct the
sale.
The Association's board of directors then proposed an access gate sys-
tem for security reasons. Each owner would have access to his parking
space through an electronically controlled gate. The system was ap-
proved by the necessary majority, and the Association moved to imple-
ment it. Dickerson did not like the idea. She refused to allow the
installation of a gate on her parking space and refused to pay the addi-
tional assessment for the system. She was charged late fees, and, subse-
quently, the Association refused to accept partial payments of
assessments from her.
Around this same time, the Association changed the parking rules to
prohibit parking more than one car in a space. Dickerson had been park-
ing two cars, so, under the rules, the Association had one of the cars
towed. It placed a concrete block in her parking space to prevent her
from parking in the part of her space intended, according to the Associa-
tion, for bikes.
The Association filed a notice of lien in the County records, posted her
unit for foreclosure, and conducted a foreclosure sale on the first Tuesday
of the month. Dickerson sought and obtained a temporary restraining
order on the day after the foreclosure sale, and subsequently obtained a
temporary injunction, after which the Association rescinded its sale.367
The Association counterclaimed in the injunction action for a declaratory
judgment that its actions were consistent with its rights and duties.
Dickerson argued that the Association could not exercise a power of
sale, because the declaration did not include a power of sale or set forth
the procedures for conducting a sale. She also argued that the attempt to
rectify this shortcoming by amending the by-laws was ineffective. She did
not contend that the by-law provision lacked the language needed to pro-
vide the power of sale, so the only issue the court had to decide was
whether having the wording set out in the by-laws was sufficient. The
court held that the by-laws were enough. 368 Although all of the condo-
minium statutes since 1963 have specified what must be in a declaration,
none of them has required the declaration to state whether a power of
sale exists, and none has prohibited the by-laws from including these pro-
visions. Dickerson did not prove that the declaration had to have power
of sale language, so the by-laws were enough and non-judicial foreclosure
was allowed. 369
Dickerson then argued that she should not have been ordered to pay
the assessment for the security gate, because the Association did not ob-
367. See id. at 183.
368. See id. at 684.
369. See id. at 685.
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tain her consent for it before construction. The declaration provided that
no alterations of common areas could be made without seventy-five per-
cent owner approval and without the consent of any owner whose rights
are being interfered with. The declaration also required the consent of
mortgagees, prohibited changing the pro rata interest or obligations of
any unit for the purpose of levying assessments, and prohibited alteration
of limited common elements without the consent of all owners. Based on
these provisions, Dickerson argued that the gate system interfered with
her rights to the limited common element, the parking space, and that the
gate system was an alteration of a limited common element done without
the consent of all owners.
The court first dispensed with Dickerson's claim that the gate system
violated the prohibition against changing the pro rata interest or obliga-
tions of an owner. The court interpreted that provision to prohibit chang-
ing the percentage interest of an owner. 370 Here, although the new
assessments changed the dollar amount of the obligation, it did not
change the pro rata character of the assessment. The court also held that
the gate system did not alter the limited common element.371
Finally, the court dispensed with Dickerson's argument that the gate
system interfered with her rights without her consent. 372 The court noted
her admission that she still had control over and access to the gate for her
parking space. The court also noted that the system was put in place to
protect all of the owners from incidents that Dickerson acknowledged
existed.
The court ruled against Dickerson on her claims regarding the parking
restriction. 373 She argued that the Association had wrongfully seized her
parking space. The rules for parking spaces clearly prohibited parking
two cars and clearly designated a bike storage area. She repeatedly vio-
lated these rules. To the extent that the rules were properly adopted,
Dickerson had not proven that the Association's actions interfered with
her ability to park in accordance with them.374 Additionally, Dickerson
did not allege that the rules were improperly adopted.
Finally, Dickerson complained about the award of over $30,000 for at-
torneys' fees. This was, after all, a lawsuit over a $3,200 claim. Unfortu-
nately for her, she did not assert that the attorney's rates were
unreasonable or point out any work that was unnecessary. 375
In Sunday Canyon Property Owners Association v. Annett,376 the Sun-
day Canyon subdivision was platted and subject to restrictive covenants.
The covenants included a provision stating that they were binding on
each owner of the lots for a term of ten years, and were automatically
370. See id. at 686.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 687.
374. See id.
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extended for additional periods of ten years "unless terminated or
changed by a recorded vote by a majority of the then owners of the lots in
this subdivision." An additional provision reiterated the right to amend,
stating it could be done on the vote of fifty-one percent of the owners and
was valid only when the amendment was recorded.
The Annetts bought two lots in the subdivision. Subsequently, a major-
ity of owners adopted changes to the restrictions which created an owners
association and set out provisions for assessments and assessment liens.
The Annetts complained that the modification of the restrictions was in-
valid, arguing that the provision for adopting modification was unen-
forceable as to voting procedures and purposes. The trial court found
that modification procedures were enforceable, but that the creation of
the owners association and the provision for assessments and liens ex-
ceeded the original purposes of the right to amend contemplated by the
original restrictions.
The court of appeals held that the creation of the association and the
provision for assessments and liens were valid. Property owners have the
right to contract with relation to their property as they see fit, in absence
of contraventions of public policy or positive law. The plat and dedica-
tion by which the original restrictions were created also created the right
to change those restrictions by the written consent of a majority. The
majority vote to add these additional provisions did not destroy the dedi-
cation but made changes in exact accordance with it to further the pur-
pose of the restrictions.
Malmgren v. Inverness Forest Residents Civic Club, Inc.377 dealt with
restrictions on keeping livestock in a residential subdivision. In 1991,
Malmgren bought a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig, brought it home, and
named it Whoopi. Malmgren kept the pig as a pet in his house. Accord-
ing to the court, Malmgren had no intention of eating, breeding, or selling
her. In 1991, on Thanksgiving, to be exact, Whoopi was shown to the
neighbors, including the block captain, who, in testimony, remembered
watching Malmgren feed Whoopi some watermelon in 1991. No attempt
was ever made to hide Whoopi from the neighbors. Like other pets in
this neighborhood, Whoopi was well-kept, in a glassed-in, heated and air
conditioned patio or the fenced back yard. Whoopi liked to play with the
dog in the front yard sometimes.
Inverness Forest is a subdivision outside of Houston, which is subject to
many restrictive covenants. One of the restrictions prohibits the keeping
of "hogs" and other livestock. In 1995, the owners association brought a
lawsuit to bar Whoopi from the subdivision: they failed. It had been
more than four years since the association discovered, via the block cap-
tain, that Whoopi was there, and the statute of limitations had run.




Discussed previously in the "Deeds and Conveyances" section,
Sanchez v. Telles378 also contains a homestead issue. In this case, Mon-
toya pledged a parcel of property as collateral for two bail bonds for her
son-in-law. At the time she signed the deed of trust, she did not claim the
property as a homestead, and there was never a designation of homestead
recorded. The deed of trust contained wording that represented that the
property was not a homestead and that disclaimed any homestead in the
property. When the son-in-law jumped bond, the bond was forfeited.
After the bond forfeiture, Montoya signed a power of attorney in favor of
her daughter. The daughter then sold the property to Sanchez, although,
for some unexplained reason, neither Montoya's signature nor her daugh-
ter's signature was on the deed, which was signed only by Sanchez.
Meanwhile, the bond agency foreclosed, and the property was sold to
Telles, who received a trustee's deed. In subsequent litigation, Montoya
claimed that the property was her homestead at the time the deed of trust
was executed. To establish a homestead, a person must show a combina-
tion of both overt acts of homestead usage and the intention on the part
of the owner to claim a homestead. 379 Here, the only evidence of home-
stead before the court was merely an affidavit that Montoya had lived in
the house for eight years. There was no other evidence that the property
was her homestead, and she had signed an affidavit that clearly stated it
was not her homestead. 380
Previously cited for its DTPA issues, Brown v. Bank of Galveston,
N.A. 38 1 also contains a homestead issue. In this case, Vincent Brown
married Hyacinth in Jamaica, then moved back to Galveston, leaving her
behind. In Galveston, he contracted with a builder to build a house. All
of the documents listed Brown as a single man. The mechanic's lien con-
tract and note were assigned to the Bank. After disputes arose with the
bank, Brown claimed the mechanic's lien was not valid. First, he claimed
the contract was not signed by his wife, which was true. Unfortunately,
Brown had not asked for a jury finding as to his wife's homestead rights,
so, unless those rights were conclusively established otherwise, Brown
would lose on that issue. The court found that the statements in the loan
documents to the effect that Brown was a single man were sufficient to
raise a fact question and to prevent the issue of his wife's homestead from
being conclusively proven. 382
Second, Brown claimed that work had commenced and materials had
been delivered before the contract was signed. The mechanic's lien con-
tract recited that no work had been done and no materials had been de-
livered. The bank relied upon that statement in advancing funds, which
378. 960 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, writ denied).
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estopped Brown from later contesting the validity of the lien.383
In McKee v. Smith,384 the court followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in
In re John Taylor Co.385 by holding that the business homestead exemp-
tion applies to real property titled to a family member but leased to a
corporation that is wholly owned by a family member.386
XIV. BROKERS
Last year a Houston appeals court gave us an interesting decision in
the saga of brother/seller disputes in Blackstone v. Thalman.387 Black-
stone signed an exclusive listing agreement with Thalman to sell his
house. The agreement provided that Thalman would attempt to sell the
house at a set price, and her six percent commission would be payable
when she procured a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase the prop-
erty at the price and terms stated in the agreement or at any other price
and terms acceptable to the seller. Thalman located a potential buyer,
and negotiations began, with various offers being made, refined, and re-
jected by the seller. The final offer was at the requested purchase price
but was subject to obtaining a satisfactory appraisal at that price and pro-
vided for an extended period of possession by Blackstone after the clos-
ing. The offer was not accepted by Blackstone.
Two years or so later, Thalman sent Blackstone a demand letter re-
questing her six percent commission. When he refused to pay, Thalman
sued him. The trial court found that Thalman had located a buyer who
was "ready, willing, and able" to buy the house on the terms set out in the
listing agreement. 388
The court of appeals reversed. The listing agreement provided that the
proposed buyer must offer to buy at the price and terms stated in the
agreement or on other terms acceptable to the seller. Here, the court
said, it was undisputed that the buyer did not offer to purchase the house
on the same terms set forth in the listing agreement The buyer added a
requirement that the seller provide an appraisal and the seller insisted on
remaining in the house for 90 days after closing. Since neither of those
provisions were in the listing agreement, "the parties were attempting to
negotiate a contract distinctly different from the one envisioned in the
listing agreement. '389
Even though the seller agreed during negotiations that he would pro-
vide the appraisal, the buyer did not agree to the seller's continued pos-
session of the property. The compromises made during the negotiations
were nothing more than counteroffers, which are rejections of offers and
383. See id.
384. 965 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, writ denied).
385. 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991).
386. See McKee, 965 S.W.2d at 53.
387. 949 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
388. See id. at 471.
389. Id. at 472-73.
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not acceptances. Accordingly, "[a] compromise during negotiations is
simply not an agreement. ' 391)
"Moreover, public policy favors commercial transactions."'391 Once a
prospective buyer has rejected an offer of sale on certain terms, the par-
ties should be encouraged to negotiate a contract under alternative terms.
It is feared that "without this freedom to negotiate, sellers will be reluc-
tant to make counteroffers, sales will diminish, commerce will suffer, and
real estate agents will earn fewer commissions. '392 Thus, the court held
that as a matter of law, the phrase "at any other price and terms accepta-
ble to Owner" does not include proposed terms conditionally "agreed to"
by the owner during negotiations but never "accepted" in a formal con-
tract. 393 "Rather, we believe the only reasonable interpretation of this
phrase, consistent with the law of contracts, is that it refers to modifica-
tions of the listing agreement that may occur with the consent of the
seller and his real estate agent. '394
XV. TITLE INSURANCE
First American Title Insurance Co. of Texas v. Willard395 deals with a
borrower's rights as a party to a title insurance contract. Willard wanted
to build a house, for which he obtained financing from the Bank. In con-
nection with the construction loan, the Bank received an interim con-
struction binder from First American, issued through Pearson Abstract.
As a result of a search error, the binder failed to note the presence of a
Lone Star Gas easement. When the house was about half finished, it was
learned that the gas lines went directly underneath the house. The Bank
ceased funding the loan and construction stopped while the parties tried
to decide how to proceed.
At the Bank's request, First American honored its obligations under
the binder and issued a policy, taking no exception for the easement. The
Bank then resumed funding the loan and the house was completed, with
the gas line still in place. The house was then finished and refinanced.
Willard and Lone Star sued the Bank and First American.
Willard and Lone Star first claimed that First American was liable
under section 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code,396 which prohibits un-
fair claims settlement. Although section 21.21 does not provide a third
party a direct cause of action against an insurer for an unfair settlement
practice, both Lone Star and Willard thought that the rule did not apply
in this situation. Lone Star argued that First American had admitted lia-
bility; however, the court held that the only liability to which First Ameri-
can had admitted was to the Bank under its policy, and Lone Star was not





395. 949 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-'Tyler 1997, no writ).
396. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. § 21.21, § 15 (Vernon 1997).
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allowed to benefit from that admission. Willard argued that section 21.21
provided him a cause of action because he had paid the premium for the
policy and because he would directly benefit from the payment of the
claim by the insurer.
The court held that merely paying the premium did not inject the bor-
rower into the title insurance contract as a party.397 In addition, the mere
fact that a third party would benefit from the performance of a contract
does not place the third party into a contractual relationship with the
parties. Willard could have bought a title policy to protect his interests,
but did not.398
Lone Star then raised the issue of aiding and abetting the trespass on
its easement. A mortgagee title policy imposes only the duty to indem-
nify the insured. Lone Star argued that First American had aided the
trespass by honoring its obligations under the interim binder without ex-
cepting the easement, thus allowing the Bank to continue funding and the
house to be finished. The court held that First American was required to
honor the obligations under the binder, was not liable for aiding a tres-
pass, and had no authority or ability to eliminate the trespass. 399 (The
bank did not fare so well. See discussion infra under Lender Liability).
The court then scrutinized the amount of damages for which First
American was liable under the policy. The trial court had awarded
$16,000 to Lone Star, which was roughly the amount needed to move the
pipeline. The court of appeals examined whether that amount was the
amount of loss sustained by the Bank. The court noted that the presence
of an eight inch high pressure gas pipeline under the Willard house mate-
rially depreciated the value of the property, and thus the value of the
Bank's collateral. First American was entitled to indemnification from
the Title Company for that loss of value.
XVI. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, MECHANICS' LIENS,
AND CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
Tips v. Hartland Developers, Inc.40 0 is a case of first impression involv-
ing an implied covenant dispute. Tips and Hartland entered into an
agreement under which Hartland would construct an airplane hangar. At
some point, Hartland stopped working. Hartland claimed it had not been
paid; Tips claimed that Hartland's work was defective, primarily because
Hartland had neither built an access ramp, or completed the electrical
work, and had failed to comply with the San Antonio fire code require-
ments. As a result, Tips was unable to get a certificate of occupancy. The
trial court found that bringing the project into compliance with the fire
code was not contemplated in the parties' agreement. 40 1 Tips argued that
397. See id. at 348.
398. Id.
399. See id. at 350.
400. 961 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
401. See id. at 620-21.
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the trial court should have found that there were implied covenants in the
construction contract which require a builder to deliver a building that
complies with relevant building codes and regulations.
Texas courts are typically hesitant to recognize implied covenants. 40 2
Such covenants are to be implied only "when there is a satisfactory basis
in the express contracts of the parties which makes it necessary to imply
certain duties and obligations in order to effect the purposes of the par-
ties. . .. ,,4"3 It must appear that the implied covenant was so clearly
within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary
to express.
The court noted that "[e]very contract incorporates existing law, and a
party's obligations under a contract are measured by the standard of
[those] laws.' '4 4 The existing fire codes required newly constructed
buildings to meet certain standards, although they did not state whether
the burden for compliance rested on the owner or the builder. This court
thought there was ample case law to suggest the burden for compliance
should rest with the builder, barring a contrary agreement. 40 5
The court noted other implied covenants applicable to builders. For
example, there is an implied covenant to perform the contract with care,
skill, and reasonable experience, and an implied covenant to deliver a
building that is habitable. The reason for these implied covenants include
the fact that builders are in the business of constructing buildings free of
defects. In addition, buyers are not in a position to discern defects and
cannot normally rely on their own judgment in such matters; rather, buy-
ers rely on builders to construct in a good and workmanlike manner, and
the builder is the only one who knows the manner in which the building
was built.40 6 Thus, the court held that "a cause of action is available to
plaintiffs for breach of contract where a contractor has failed to comply
with building codes relevant to the intended use of the structure. '40 7
Texas clarified a statutory payment requirement in National Environ-
mental Service Company, Inc. v. Homeplace Homes, Inc.40 8 Texas Prop-
erty Code section 28.003, which governs payments to contractors and
subcontractors, provides that the owner is required to pay interest on
overdue payments. 40 9 It does not state who is entitled to receive interest
on an overdue amount. This court held that only the contractor, not a
subcontractor, is entitled to interest.410 Chapter 28 of the Property Code
expressly requires an owner to pay a contractor. 411 In turn, the contrac-
402. See id. at 621.
403. See id. (cited in Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty, 6 S.W.2d
1039, 1040-41 (1928)).
404. Id.
405. See id. at 622.
406. See id.
407. Id.
408. 961 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
409. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 28.003 (Vernon 1993).
410. See Homeplace Homes, 961 S.W.2d at 636.
411. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 28.002a (Vernon 1993).
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tor is obligated to pay the subcontractor. 412 The court summarized:
[r]ead as a whole, chapter 28 does not require the owner to pay a subcon-
tractor the principle sum or any interest. '413
In another clarification of a statute, a Houston appellate court dealt
with subcontractors' rights in Hadnot v. Wenco Distributors.414 Texas
Property Code section 53.084(b) states: "If the owner has received the
notices required by Subchapter C [notices of mechanics' lien affidavits
and funds trapping notices], and if the claim has been reduced to final
judgment", the owner is liable and the owner's property subject to claims
for any money paid to the contractor after receiving those notices.41 5 The
Hadnots built a house and paid off the contractor but failed to keep the
required retainage. As a result, several mechanic's liens were filed by
subcontractors.
The Hadnots claimed that section 53.084(b) requires the subcontractors
to obtain a judgment against the contractor before they could be found
liable. This is a very generous, and quite erroneous, reading of section
53.084(b) and the mechanic's lien statutes in general. Section 53.084(b)
relates to the establishment and foreclosure of the lien. As the court
noted, "[a] mechanic's lien is not created by agreement of the parties"
and is not self-enforcing. 416 It can only be established and foreclosed by
judicial order. Therefore, a final judgment is necessary before the sub-
contractors can receive payment from the owner.417 The "final judg-
ment" referred to is the final judgment against the owner.
Wiggins v. Overstree 18 dealt with the level of proof necessary to show
one is a builder for purposes of liability. Wiggins sued Thomas S. Over-
street (Steve) for construction defects in a townhome he sold her, alleging
that Steve was the builder/owner of the townhome and was liable for
breach of the implied covenant of good workmanship and habitability.
Steve claimed that he did not build the townhome.
A builder gives implied covenants of good workmanship and habitabil-
ity; however, the seller of a used building does not.419 Steve was an em-
ployee of the builder at the time the townhome was built. The builder
was a corporation owned by Steve's father. The only actions Steve took
were as an employee of the actual builder. Various statements made by
Steve that he had built the townhome were not conclusive proof of liabil-
ity.420 The statements that he had "built" the townhome could have
meant that he had ordered it built by the contractor. 421
412. Homeplace Homes, 961 S.W.2d at 636.
413. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 28.002b (Vernon 1993).
414. 961 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
415. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.084(b) (Vernon 1995).
416. Hadnot, 961 S.W.2d at 235.
417. See id.
418. 962 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
419. See id. at 200.
420. See id. at 201-02.
421. See id. at 202.
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Texas has upheld its general rule that substantial compliance is suffi-
cient for a mechanics lien affidavit. In Richardson v. Mid-Cities Drywall,
Inc.,422 Mid-Cities filed a mechanic's lien affidavit against Richardson's
property for materials and labor it had provided but for which it was not
paid. The lien affidavit did not contain the business address of Mid-Cities
within the sworn portion of the affidavit, as required by Texas Property
Code section 53.054.423 The address was in the "after recording return
to" section on the back of the document.
As a general rule, the mechanic's lien statutes are liberally construed to
protect mechanics and materialmen.424 Substantial compliance is re-
quired, not strict compliance. Because the affidavit contained everything
else required by the statute and because the address on the document
provided the means for contacting the claimant, the court held this affida-
vit substantially complied with the statute.425
XVII. CONDEMNATION
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale 26 involved a stunning challenge to city
zoning ordinance authority. Over an extended period of time the
Mayhews assemble a large piece of farmland, which by 1986 was entirely
within the city limits of Sunnyvale. The Mayhews decided that they
would like to develop the farmland, and they met with the city to discuss
their plans. The Mayhews were told that the city's current zoning ordi-
nances would not accommodate their plans. Later, the city's ordinance
changed, and the Mayhews submitted another plan.
Two months after the Mayhews submitted their plan, the city passed a
moratorium on planned developments. The processing continued on the
Mayhews' plan but the city counsel finally rejected it. After their applica-
tion was denied, the Mayhews did not appeal in accordance with the city's
ordinances. Instead, they filed this lawsuit, alleging statutory and consti-
tutional violations. At trial, the judge found that Sunnyvale had violated
the Mayhews' constitutional rights of substantive due process and equal
protection and had engaged in a taking without compensation by denying
the Mayhews' proposal.427 The court of appeals held that the issue was
not ripe for adjudication and reversed. 428
The Texas Supreme Court dealt first with the issue of ripeness, holding
that the issue was indeed ripe.429 Regarding the taking issue, the court
first noted that, as a general rule, the allocation of a general zoning law to
a particular property constitutes a taking only if the ordinance "'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or [if] it denies the owner
422. 968 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
423. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.084 (Vernon 1995).
424. See Mid-Cities Drywall, 968 S.W.2d at 514.
425. See id. at 515.
426. 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998).
427. See id. at 927-28.
428. See id. at 928.
429. See id. at 932.
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all economically viable use of his land."' 430 The court found that Sunny-
vale did have a substantial interest in maintaining the character of the
town and that "its action in denying the Mayhews' planned development
furthered those interests."'431
However, a compensable taking can also occur when a governmental
agency imposes restrictions that either "deny a landowner all economi-
cally viable use of [his] property or unreasonably interfere with the land-
owners' rights to use and enjoy [the] property.432 The court held that the
Mayhews were not entitled to relief under these two theories either.433
They had ranched their property for four decades in a town with a tiny
population. Thus, they did not have the reasonable investment-backed
expectation that they could pursue an extensive development that would
more than quadruple the population of Sunnyvale. The court then ren-
dered a take nothing judgment against the Mayhews because, as a matter
of law, the Mayhews did not prevail on their just compensation claims or
other claims.
The court clarified when the statute of limitations begins to run on in-
verse condemnation actions stemming from a city ordinance in Trail En-
terprises, Inc. v. City of Houston.434 The statute of limitations applicable
to inverse condemnation actions is the same as the ten year period of
limitations to acquire land by adverse possession.435 In this case, Trail
claimed a Houston non-drilling ordinance was an inverse condemnation.
The ordinance had been passed in 1954, but the action was not brought
until 1995. The date the ordinance is enacted is the date a cause of action
commences for this type of inverse condemnation, unless a party can
show that "it did not discover its cause of action until a later date. 436
Texas courts showed continued reluctance in finding a taking or nui-
sance in City of Laredo v. R. Vela Exxon, Inc. 437 In order to deal with the
increased traffic flow and inspection time for trucks going into Mexico
after NAF-TA, the city re-routed traffic in a way that resulted in long lines
of trucks blocking access to the Velas' gas station. The Velas sued, alleg-
ing that the blocking of their gas station constituted a taking and a
nuisance.
Although in State of Texas v. Heal438 the Texas Supreme Court held
that it was possible under some circumstances for traffic itself to consti-
tute a taking under Article 1, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, no
compensable taking can occur where the government has not directly re-
430. See id. at 933 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138,
2151 (1980)).
431. Id. at 935.
432. Id.
433. See id. at 938.
434. 957 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
435. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.026 (Vernon 1997).
436. See Trail Enterprises, 957 S.W.2d at 633.
437. 966 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
438. 917 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. 1996).
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stricted the use of the landowner's property.439 A direct restriction con-
sists of an "actual physical or legal restriction on the property's use, such
as blocking of access or denial of a permit for development. '440 All im-
paired access cases in which the landowner has received compensation
have occurred where the city created physical obstructions.441
In this case, the City had not imposed an actual physical or legal re-
striction on the use of the gas station. Nor had the City undertaken any
public improvement which tangentially affected the traffic flow. The only
actions taken by the City were a refusal to eliminate the street as a desig-
nated truck route and a re-routing of traffic from other designated truck
routes. These were not the type of direct restrictions which allowed for
compensation."42
The court also refused to hold that the City's actions constituted a nui-
sance." 3 A municipality can be liable for creating a nuisance only for the
non-negligent performance of a governmental function. 444 This means
the level of culpabilility must reach that of gross negligence or higher. In
this case, the only intentional act by the city was the designation of truck
routes. While the diversion of trucks may have increased the traffic, it
was the ever-increasing number of trucks that caused the problem and
not the city's act.
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. Callaway445 also dealt with in-
verse condemnation Callaway owns property on which the Texas Parks
and Wildlife (Department) had an easement for a waterway pass. The
Department decided to open the pass to the public, even though the ease-
ment stated that the pass would be closed to all water traffic except De-
partment personnel. Callaway sued, alleging that opening the pass
violated the easement and constituted a taking by inverse condemnation.
The Department said that it decided to open the pass to the public be-
cause it considered the waters "public waters" and that it had no author-
ity to restrict public access. It also claimed it did not intentionally take
the easement.
An inverse condemnation occurs when "the state or its agency physi-
cally takes or invades property, or when it unreasonably interferes with
the owner's right to use and enjoy the property."446 The Department's
first argument was that the action for inverse condemnation was an at-
tempt to disguise a contract claim that would have been barred by sover-
eign immunity. Sovereign immunity protects the state from suit without
its consent.447 In general "[e]ntering into a contract waives the state's
439. See id. at 9-10.
440. See City of Laredo, 966 S.W.2d at 680 (quoting Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d
488, 452 (Tex. 1992)).
441. See id.
442. See id.
443. See id. at 681.
444. See id. at 680 (citations omitted).
445. 971 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, n.w.h.).
446. Id. (citations omitted).
447. See id. at 149.
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immunity from liability, but not its immunity from suit. ' 448 Inverse con-
demnation is an exception to sovereign immunity.449 Here, Callaway was
trying to have the easement contract construed, but that was not his only
claim. The existence of the contract did not end the inquiry.
In this case, the Department claimed it had taken nothing but had
merely made the decision that it had no right to bar the public from using
the pass. Thus, since it was operating under a good faith belief that it was
acting in an authorized way, the Department argued, it should not be
subject to suit. However, the cases cited by the Department were all
cases dealing with contract claims in the context of sovereign immunity.
Here, the context was different. The Department was not merely refus-
ing to perform under its contract, it was putting up signs inviting the pub-
lic to use the easement area.
The Department fell back onto the "public waters" provisions of the
Constitution. It argued that because it was required to take the actions
prescribed by the Constitution, it had no constitutional duty to compen-
sate when that results in a taking. The court disagreed.450 Many, if not
most, acts that end up causing an inverse condemnation can be traced to
a legal mandate. 451 The court finally held that to adopt the Department's
argument would emasculate the takings provision of the Constitution. 452
The Butler v. State of Texas453 case includes an excellent discussion and
application of the principles announced in State of Texas v. Schmidt.454
XVIII. AD VALOREM TAXATION
Rosewood Properties, Inc. v. Community Credit Union45 5 involved as-
signment of tax liens. Rosewood and Community Credit Union (CCU)
each owned an undivided one-half interest in a piece of property. For the
years 1986 and 1987, however, when CCU's interest was owned by the
William Herbert Hunt Trust, Rosewood paid all of the ad valorem taxes
on the property. The payments were made pursuant to an agreement
with the Trust, which included an assignment of the tax liens to Rose-
wood in accordance with section 32.06 of the Texas Property Tax Code.456
Rosewood later sued CCU to enforce its tax liens on the property.
At trial, CCU argued that, because Rosewood was jointly and severally
liable for taxes on the property, the tax liens were extinguished by Rose-
wood's payment of the taxes. According to CCU, section 32.06 autho-
rizes assignments of tax liens only when a person pays someone else's
448. See id.
449. See id.
450. See id. at 150.
451. See id. at 151.
452. See id.
453. 973 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1998, no pet.).
454. 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993).
455. 944 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, writ denied).
456. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 32.06 (Vernon 1997).
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taxes. The trial court agreed, and the court of appeals reversed. 457 Prop-
erty taxes are owed by the person who owns the property.458 Rosewood
did not own the property against which it claimed the tax liens; it owned
the other undivided one-half interest in the land and buildings.
XIX. ENTITIES
Hughes v. St. David's Support Corporation459 reinforces the duties
owed by a general partner to a limited partner. In this case, the general
partner of two partnerships failed to notify Hughes, an owner of a very
small interest in those partnerships, of the sale of the assets of the part-
nerships. The general partner admitted at trial that it failed to notify
Hughes because it was concerned that Hughes might interfere with the
sale. Hughes sued, alleging that the failure to notify it of the sale was a
breach of the general partner's fiduciary duties.
It is well established that partners have fiduciary duties.460 Citing
Crenshaw v. Swenson,461 the court noted: "in a limited partnership, the
general partner stands in the same fiduciary capacity to the limited part-
ners as a trustee stands to the beneficiaries of a trust. ' 462 Thus, it was
clear to the court that a fiduciary duty was owed to Hughes.
The general partner then contended that, even though it may have a
fiduciary duty to Hughes, the failure to notify Hughes of the sale was not
a violation since Hughes owned an insignificant interest in the partner-
ships. The court held that the size of the interest was irrelevant; because
Hughes owned an interest, he was entitled to notice before the assets
were sold.463 The court was moved by the fact that Hughes was the only
partner not informed of the sale.
Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards 464 involved a suit against an apart-
ment complex on a theory of espondeat superior. Edwards was severely
beaten by two men who were employed by an apartment complex.
Among those he sued was the leasing agent. The trial court held that
there was insufficient evidence that the leasing agent was a vice principal
of the owner and that she was grossly negligent. 465
In Texas, in order to find a corporation liable for exemplary damages in
a gross negligence case, the default for which the exemplary damages are
sought must be the "very act of the corporation itself," or, if it is the act
of an agent, the agent must have been specifically authorized by the cor-
poration to perform the act.466 A corporation's liability in punitive dam-
457. See Rosewood, 944 S.W.2d at 47.
458. See id. at 48; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 32.07(a) (Vernon 1997).
459. 944 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
460. See id. at 425.
461. 611 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Austin 1980, writ denied).
462. 944 S.W.2d at 425-6.
463. See Hughes, 944 S.W.2d at 426.
464. 958 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1997).
465. See id. at 390.
466. See id. at 391.
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ages for its servant's acts does not fall within the realm of respondeat
superior.46
7
The court adopted the term "vice principal" to refer to the type of ser-
vant or agent whose acts can bring on an award of exemplary damages.
A vice principal is a corporate officer who has the authority to employ,
direct, and discharge servants of the master, who is engaged in the per-
formance of nondelegable or absolute duties of the master, and those to
whom the master has delegated the management of the corporation, a
department, or division. 468 "Corporate officer" is a term used rather
loosely, meaning anyone "who represents the corporation in its corporate
capacity. " 469
The apartment manager was a vice principal of the owner; however, the
leasing agent was not. She had no authority to hire or fire employees or
to engage contractors. She did not hire the men who assaulted Edwards
nor did she have the authority to terminate them. The most she did was
consult with the assailant on which apartments to clean. Edwards' con-
tention that the leasing agent was the principal was based on the fact that
she was the only representative of the owner on site when the assault
occurred; the court disagreed with that argument. 470
XX. INDEMNITIES
This year brought helpful clarification on the issue of indemnities. In
Green International, Inc. v. Solis, 471 a provision in a contract between a
contractor and his subcontractor stated that the contractor would not be
liable to the subcontractor for delays in the subcontractor's work caused
by the neglect or default of the owner, contractor, or others. The provi-
sion was not made conspicuous, but rather was in the same typeface as
the rest of the contract.
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc.,472 the Texas
Supreme Court held that certain contract provisions for relieving a party
in advance for its own neglect must be unambiguous and conspicuous. 47 3
However, in this case, the court held that the Dresser rule did not apply
to "no-damage-for-delay" clauses. 47 4 This type of clause, according to the
court, did not involve the extraordinary shifting of risks of the type de-
scribed in Dresser. It was not an indemnity because it did not shift the
risk for third party claims. It was not a release because it did not extin-
guish a claim or cause of action. It was merely a shift in the economic
consequences of a delay.475
467. See id.
468. See id. (citing Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 70 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. 1934)).
469. See id.
470. See id. at 392.
471. 951 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1997).
472. 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).





An important development in indemnity law arose in Polley v.
Odom.4 76 In that case a commercial lease contained the following provi-
sion: "(a) Risk of Loss. Except where due to the willful neglect of Lessor
all risk of loss to personal property or loss to business resulting from any
cause whatsoever shall be born exclusively by Lessee. '477
A fire broke out in the premises as a result of the landlord's negli-
gence. The trial court held that the tenant's cause of action for negli-
gence was barred by this exculpatory provision. On appeal, the tenant
claimed that the express negligence doctrine applies to the exculpation
clause, rendering the exculpation unenforceable; thus, the court should
allow the negligence claim.
The express negligence doctrine arose in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Con-
struction Co.478 In a nutshell, it required that people seeking to indemnify
against their own negligence must express that intent in specific terms.479
In other words, it is necessary to expressly articulate that the indemnity is
intended to indemnify against ones own negligence. The doctrine has
also been extended to releases from liability. 48°
The court noted that the risk of loss provision in the lease was not an
indemnity, but rather a release.481 The tenant was agreeing to assume all
risk of property or business loss from any cause except willful neglect.
The court held that the risk of loss provision was subject to the express
negligence rule.482
Having determined that the rule applied, the court went on to hold that
this provision did not satisfy the rule.483 The provision did not expressly
state that the landlord had no liability for his own negligence. The exclu-
sion of negligence is implicit rather than explicit, which is insufficient.
The express negligence doctrine is to be literally applied.484
An issue not pointed out by the court, but significant from a drafting
standpoint, is that Dresser requires agreements subject to the express
negligence rule to be conspicuous.485
After this opinion was published, the parties settled the case. The
Waco Court of Appeals entered judgment in accordance with the settle-
ment, but because the case addresses matters of public importance, the
court refused to withdraw the opinion or to redesignate it as an unpub-
lished opinion.48 6
476. 957 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet.).
477. Id. at 935.
478. 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
479. See id. at 708.
480. Dresser Industries v. Page Petroleum, 853 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. 1993).
481. See Polley, 957 S.W.2d at 936.
482. See id. at 937.
483. See id. at 938.
484. See id.
485. See Dresser, 855 S.W.2d at 509.




In Chubb Lloyds Insurance Company of Texas v. Kizer48 7 a Fort Worth
appeals court ruled with the Fifth Circuit concerning community property
destroyed by one spouse. Kris and Terrie Kizer were husband and wife.
They owned a house, that was insured by Chubb. The house burned
down, and it appeared to have been intentionally set by Kris. At least the
jury thought so, although the jury also concluded that Terrie had nothing
to do with the fire.4 88 Terrie sought to recover at least her community
property interest in the house and its contents.
The Texas Supreme Court has never determined whether an innocent
spouse may recover a share of community property destroyed by a fire
caused by the other spouse.489 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that the innocent spouse cannot recover. 490
In Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Insurance Company, the
supreme court did hold that an innocent spouse can collect insurance for
destruction of her separate property.49' Kulubis expressly did not deal
with community property issues. Only the Amarillo Court of Appeals
has done that, in Travelers Cos. v. Wolfe.4 9 2 In that case, the property had
been converted to separate property pursuant to a divorce. The Fifth Cir-
cuit has also held that an innocent spouse cannot collect for destruction
of community property.493
We conclude that it would be a strange rule indeed that guaranteed
to would-be arsonist a minimum of one-half of the insured value of
his building-paid in cash and as community property-even were
he found guilty of the act, so long as he arranged matters so that the
insurance company could not prove that he had let his spouse in on
his scheme.494
In other words, both the house and the insurance policy are commu-
nity property. Any proceeds paid under the insurance policy for damage
to the house would likewise be community property, allowing the wrong-
doer to share in the proceeds. Absent a severance of the community es-
tate as to the proceeds, Terrie could not receive proceeds in any way that
did not benefit Kris. The court held that the public policy of not re-
warding wrongdoers must be the overriding concern.495
487. 943 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
488. See id. at 948.
489. See id. at 951.
490. See id. at 952.
491. 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986).
492. 838 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
493. See Chubb, 943 S.W.2d at 748.
494. Norman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 804 F.2d 1365, 1366 (5 Cir.
1986).
495. See Chubb, 943 S.W.2d at 952.
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